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Abstract
Some problems are so complex that you have to be highly intelligent and
well-informed just to be undecided about them (Conklin, 2001, p. 1)
Wicked problems are complex and challenging to solve. This is partially due to chan-
ging requirements in the problem definition, as well as the fact that proposed and
implemented solutions are generally significant in effect and irreversible in nature.
In contexts where the consequences of a solution to a wicked problem are compre-
hended as being critical to an organisation’s survival, such firms may elect to build
or acquire a decision support system (DSS) to assist decision makers with the vital
task of resolving such problems. DSSs have been shown to provide some benefit
to users by neutralising cognitive biases as well as improving effectiveness and ef-
ficiency of decision making. However, it has been argued that traditional variants
of these tools are seldom appropriate for addressing wicked problems, and as such,
an alternative approach to solving wicked problems is required to that of typical
decision making problems.
The conceptualisation of procedural rationality as a suitable underlying approach for
support of wicked problems has been argued in a number of studies. Such research
asserts that the approach focusing on the process of decision making as opposed to
the substance of the decision process. In order to investigate the nature of wicked
problems and decision support in these contexts, a primarily qualitative literature
study was completed.
Literature was collected systematically by making use of keyword search, backward
search, and forward search. Studies were further analysed to ensure that they ex-
plicitly addressed the notion of wicked problems and decision support utilising any
combination of theoretical or empirical approaches. The final literature sample con-
sisted of 35 peer-reviewed journal articles from a number of subject areas.
The quantitative element of the literature study found that empirical case studies
are the most common research design in this research area, followed by applied-
concept theoretical studies. It was also discovered that strategic, business, and
organisational planning problems, along with environmental and natural resource
planning problems, are the most frequently addressed wicked problem in the liter-
ature sample. Finally, the quantitative analysis found that procedural approaches
to decision support for wicked problems are the most prevalent in the literature,
consisting of almost two thirds of all studies included in the sample.
ii
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ABSTRACT iii
Qualitative analysis of the literature sample uncovered a number of requirements
for wicked problems in the context of DSSs. Examples of common characteristics
include tools for collaboration, negotiation, flexible exploration of the decision space,
and facilitation of organisational memory through storage and retrieval of previous
deliberations.
Finally, the outcomes of all of the previous phases of the study were integrated and
a model for procedural DSSs was synthesised, comprising perspectives regarding ar-
chitecture, evolutionary design and development, the decision process for procedural
decision making, and the characteristics of inquiring organisations which are argued
to be the organisational perspective most suitable for procedural DSSs.
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Opsomming
Some problems are so complex that you have to be highly intelligent and
well-informed just to be undecided about them. (Conklin, 2001, p. 1)
Wicked probleme is kompleks en moeilik om op te los. Die voortdurende veran-
dering van probleem-definisie sowel as die beduidende en onomkeerbare impak van
oplossings vir wicked probleme is twee faktore wat die uitdagingsvlak vererg. Gevalle
waar die oorlweing van ’n organisasie afhang van sy vermoe¨ om ’n wicked probleem
op to los; mag die organisasie kies om ’n Besluit Ondersteuningstelsel (BO) te bou
of te benut. Dit is al bewys dat BOs besluitnemers bevoordeel deur kognitiewe
vooroordeling te versag, effektiwiteit van besluitneming te verhoog en doeltreffend-
heid te verbeter. In teenstryding, is dit voorgesit dat tradisionele BOs weinig ’n
goeie oplossing of ondersteuningsmiddel vir wicked probleme bied. Dus word daar
ondersoek vir alternatiewe benaderings tot die ontwerp van ’n BO, in die konteks
van wicked probleme, ingestel.
Die konseptualisering van prosedurele rasionaliteit is al in verskeie studies voorgesit
as ’n goeie onderliggende benadering tot wicked probleem ondersteuning. These
studies assert that the approach focusing on the process of decision making as op-
posed to the substance of the decision process. Die ondersoek van BOs in die konteks
van wicked probleme is deur middel van ’n kwalitatiewe literatuur studie gedoen.
Relevante literatuur is versamel deur sleutelwoord-soektogte, agtertoe-soektogte en
voorwaardse-soektogte. Die studies is deursoek vir uitdruklike behandeling van BOs
en wicked probleme voordat hulle as relevant gekeur kon word. Beide teoretiese-
en empiriese studie benaderings is ingesluit. Die finale versameling van literatuur
bestaan uit 35 joernaal artikels.
Die kwantitatiewe elemente in die literatuur studie dui daarop aan dat empiriese
gevallestudies die mees algemene navorsingsontwerp in die´ veld is - dit word ge-
volg deur teoretiese, toegepaste-konsepstudies. Die studies het ook daarop aangedui
dat strategiese, besigheids, organisatoriese, omgewings en natuurlike hulpbron be-
planningsprobleme die mees algemeen is. Laastens het die kwantitatiewe analise
gevind dat prosedurele benaderings tot besluit ondersteuning vir wicked probleme
die meeste voorkom in die literatuur monster, wat amper twee derdes van die liter-
atuur monster uitmaak.
Kwalitatiewe ontleding van die literatuur monster ontbloot ’n aantal vereistes vir
wicked probleme in die konteks van BOs. Voorbeelde van algemene kenmerke sluit
iv
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OPSOMMING v
in hulpmiddels vir samewerking, onderhandeling, buigbare verkenning van die be-
sluit ruimte, en fasilitering van organisatoriese geheue deur middel van die stoor en
herwinning van die vorige redenasie prosesse.
Ten slotte, die uitkomste van al die vorige fases van die tesis is ge¨ıntegreer en ’n
model vir prosedurele BOs is gesintetiseer, insluitend perspektiewe met betrekking
tot argitektuur, evolusioneˆre ontwerp en ontwikkeling, die besluit proses vir prosed-
urele besluitneming, en die eienskappe van navraende organisasies wat aangevoer is
as die organisatoriese perspektief mees geskik vir prosedurele BOs.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
1.1 Background and Rationale
Classical conceptions of human rationality portray humanity as perfectly rational
(Simon, 1955, 1956). The postulated Economic Man, as presumed by classical eco-
nomic theorists, is omniscient in that such a human possesses perfect knowledge of
alternatives available in a decision, can evaluate these consistently, and possesses
complete knowledge of probabilities and consequences associated with each altern-
ative (Simon, 1979). In more recent literature, decision theorists argue that human
rationality “falls short of omniscience” due to limited knowledge about decision al-
ternatives, inability to accurately predict consequences, and the manifestation of
inconsistent preferences (Simon, 1979, p. 102). This bounded rationality, as coined
by Simon (1955), ultimately leads to the inability of human decision makers to ef-
fectively compare alternatives and arrive at a rational decision. In order to cope
with uncertainty, Simon (1979) further postulates that humans utilise heuristics or
rules of thumb to navigate the problem space and arrive at a satisfactory solution, as
opposed to navigating the entire problem space and arriving at an optimal solution.
Tversky & Kahneman (1974) confirm this notion of heuristics in decision making
by demonstrating that humans attempt to minimise problem complexity by decom-
posing the problem into individual judgements during utilisation of such heuristics.
Although these heuristics are considered useful in a number of areas, their applic-
ation in complex decision making contexts can lead to serious errors in judgement
(Tversky & Kahneman, 1974). Further, the decision maker’s frame, or conception
of the decision problem and evaluation of associated consequences, profoundly in-
fluences the selection of an appropriate decision strategy (Tversky & Kahneman,
1981). The authors further assert that these preferences have been demonstrated
to shift in a predictable ways, rendering the decision makers own conception of the
1
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decision problem inconsistent and incoherent, violating the normative requirements
for rationality in decision making.
The development of decision support systems (DSSs) as artefacts can be traced
back to the 1970s (Arnott & Pervan, 2008), where their development arose as a
response to large-scale, complex planning problems (Power, 2002). Pragmatically,
the objective of a DSS is to improve the effectiveness and efficiency of a decision
process as well as the outcome of that decision (Arnott, 2006; Arnott & Pervan,
2005; Keen & Morton, 1978). Conceptually, the initial aim of these systems was to
address issues regarding human rationality in decision making as outlined by Simon
(1955) and other authors (Shim et al., 2002).
DSSs are typically prescribed for decision contexts where problems can be categor-
ised as semi-structured or unstructured (Power, 2002; Sprague, 1980). These types of
problems may be difficult to quantify, and may not have an optimal solution (Power,
2002). DSSs therefore exist to support the judgement of the decision maker rather
than to select and implement a solution independently. However, traditional DSSs
are rarely appropriate resolutions for particular breeds of unstructured problems
that are ill-defined and wicked in nature (Mackenzie et al., 2006).
The notion of wicked problems as a concept was initially formulated in the liter-
ature by Horst Rittel (Rittel & Webber, 1973) in the 1970s, as a response to the
perceived failure of scientific and engineering methods at resolving these problems.
The term was originally applied to social and policy planning, juxtaposed with
the notion of tame problems which natural scientific inquiry endeavours to solve.
Wicked problems derive their name from their ambiguous nature and frequent tend-
ency to produce suboptimal and unintended consequences (Ritchey, 2013). This is
compounded by their reactive nature, which results in the definition and essence of
the problem reacting or shifting when acted upon (Ritchey, 2011). Further, these
so-called problems are not genuine problems in the true sense, as they distinctly
lack a stable definition or problem statement. Rather, they are more akin to the
unstructured messes elucidated by Ackoff (1974), where a mess refers to a collection
of problem situations whose interrelationships render the strategy of decomposing
these inextricable messes unsuitable. Both conceptualisations go beyond the notion
of unstructured decisions postulated by Gorry & Morton (1989), as the very nature
of these problems is contended to be in flux.
The objective of this chapter is to present an overview of the research conducted
in this thesis. Firstly, Section 1.2 outlines the problem statement for the research
in light of the preceding context. Secondly, an elucidation of the purpose of the
study is explored in Section 1.3. This is followed by an exposition of the primary
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and secondary research questions in Section 1.4. Following this, the research design
and underlying paradigm is elucidated in Section 1.5. Next, Section 1.6 discusses
the various limitations and inherent weaknesses of the research design employed.
Finally, Section 1.7 contextualises the study in terms of the information systems
(IS) context and its corresponding relevance for research and practice.
1.2 Statement of the Problem
Although various traditional DSSs have been developed over the years,
many of which have adequately solved the problem for which they were
created, these types of DSSs are less useful in wicked contexts. An al-
ternative approach is required.
In light of the nature of wicked problems in organisations, it is apparent that a differ-
ent type of DSS is required in order to support these kinds of problems (Mackenzie
et al., 2006). As Courtney (2001, p. 17) asserts:
Organizational decisions of the future may include social, environmental,
and economical concerns, and be much more ‘wicked’, complex, and in-
terconnected than those of the past. Organizations and their decision
support systems must embrace procedures that can deal with this com-
plexity and go beyond the technical orientation of previous DSSs.
According to Mackenzie et al. (2006), conventional DSSs assume and make use of
what is termed substantive decision support. This conception of decision support,
according to the authors, refers to the provision of situation-specific expertise based
on knowledge about the problem domain. This is facilitated by the fact that the
tame problems within these domains themselves are well-defined, although the solu-
tion may be non-trivial or complex. However, the authors argue, these substantive
DSSs are not suitable for addressing wicked problems due to their inherent instability
and ambiguity. Rather, they argue that the use of procedural DSSs is more appro-
priate for resolving wicked problems or messes. As opposed to attempting to tame
wicked problems (Conklin, 2001) with the na¨ıve view that structuring these prob-
lems renders them amenable to such substantive support, Mackenzie et al. (2006)
argue that stressing the process rather than the consequences is a superior strategy.
In this way, stakeholders involved in the problem are given the space to explore a
range of alternatives and to negotiate conflict. This correlates with the postulation
by authors such as Ritchey (2011) that define wicked problems in terms of their
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uncertain and fundamentally subjective nature. However, there are still a large pro-
portion of studies that employ some variant of substantive decision support when
proposing or developing a DSS for a wicked problem.
1.3 Purpose of the Study
The purpose of the study is to investigate the advantages of procedural
decision support over substantial decision support, to explore the preval-
ence of each in the literature, as well as to investigate the nature of DSSs
predicated on procedural rationality.
The purpose of the study, in light of the problem statement articulated in the pre-
ceding section, is twofold. The primary intention of this thesis is to qualitatively
analyse and elucidate two approaches to decision support. The secondary objectives
are to present the prevalence of each approach in the literature, to determine which
features of DSSs are required for supporting wicked problems, as well as to build a
coherent model of procedural DSS attributes for support of wicked problems.
1.4 Research Questions
1.4.1 Primary Research Question
The primary research question is as follows:
R.1: What are the implications of substantive and procedural rationality
for DSSs specifically in the context of wicked problems?
The primary objective of this thesis is to qualitatively compare two fundamental ap-
proaches to decision support as proliferated in the literature. The aim of comparing
the ramifications of the substantive and procedural approaches to decision support is
to facilitate comprehension of the application of these approaches to wicked decision
contexts, and to determine appropriateness of such approaches to these contexts.
1.4.2 Secondary Research Questions
The primary research question leads to a number of secondary questions:
R.2.1: What characteristics and activities facilitated by DSSs are desir-
able in the context of wicked problems?
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In order to design and develop any variant of DSS for supporting wicked problems, it
is imperative to uncover what is required of DSSs during the process of wicked prob-
lem resolution. The objective of this question is to determine, from the literature,
those features which are relevant for the development of such a DSS.
R.2.2: What would a procedural DSS developed specifically for resolving
wicked problems look like?
DSSs developed to support procedurally rational decision making processes are fun-
damentally different from substantively rational DSSs. It is therefore imperative to
investigate the architecture of such a system in order to present a coherent model
for procedural decision support. This secondary question aims to synthesise such a
model.
R.2.3: Which of procedural or substantive decision support approaches
are more prevalent for wicked problems in the literature?
Simon (1976) argued that procedural decision support would become more prevalent
in the years following his publication, and as reliance on pure economic theory in
decision making was diminished in favour of psychological theories. The purpose of
this question is to determine which of procedural or substantive decision support is
currently more prevalent in the peer-reviewed literature.
R.2.4: What types of wicked problems are actively addressed in the liter-
ature in the context of DSSs?
Wicked problems vary in terms of the contexts in which they arise. In order to
work towards a DSS for solving wicked problems in general, it would be useful to
determine the nature of the wicked problems addressed in the literature thus far.
This research question aims to explore the nature of wicked problems addressed in
the literature in some manner related to DSS research.
R.2.5: What is the level of cognisance of wicked problems and decision
support in the literature?
The notion of wicked problems has been explicitly mentioned in research for a num-
ber of years since its conceptualisation. To gain an understanding of the current
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state of decision support for wicked contexts, it is necessary to gain insight into the
quantity of research specifically addressing these issues over time. Thus, the aim
of this question is to discover the rate of publication of research articles concerning
decision support for wicked problems in the literature.
R.2.6: What are the primary research methodologies employed in the
literature?
Any research design and methodology is fundamentally informed by the nature of
the questions that the employed methodology seeks to answer (Mouton, 2001), and
therefore provides a great deal of insight into the field of interest. The objective of
this question is to discover which research designs and methodologies are utilised
most prominently in the literature.
1.5 Research Paradigm and Design
The application of any research design is based on a number of assumptions (Babbie
& Mouton, 2007). According to Mason (2002), it is imperative for research to make
explicit its ontological and epistemological assumptions in order to appropriately
contextualise the study. The researcher has therefore placed the study primarily
within the qualitative research paradigm, with an emphasis on interpretive methods.
The two primary methods employed within this paradigm in this thesis are that of
theory and model-building and the qualitative literature review (Babbie & Mouton,
2007; Mouton, 2001).
In order to answer the research questions in the aforementioned section, a literature
study is conducted. The nature of the literature review is primarily qualitative in
nature, with a limited set of quantitative features. The phases of the literature
review methodology employed are as follows:
The first phase of the literature review entails analysing the context of the various
reference disciplines relevant to the research area. Prominent literature in the areas
of decision making theory, procedural and substantive rationality, wicked problems,
and decision support systems literature is consulted in order to synthesise the con-
ceptual framework within which the overarching study is situated. Texts such as
seminal books, journal articles, and working papers are reviewed to achieve this aim.
The concept of procedural rationality is also clarified during this phase.
The second phase of the study is concerned with a content analysis of the literature
in the specific discipline of DSSs for wicked problems. Trends and emergent beha-
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viours are identified, and the prevalence of substantive and procedural approaches
to decision support is noted.
The final phase of the thesis methodology involves the construction of a model for
procedural DSSs, incorporating the findings of the preceding phases. This model is
qualitatively evaluated in terms of the context presented from the literature.
1.6 Limitations of Research Design
As with any research design, there are a number of limitations inherent in the
methodology and approach employed. These are outlined in the subsections that
follow.
1.6.1 Secondary vs. Primary Data
Any study which is primarily literature-based utilises secondary sources of data
as opposed to primary data actually elicited and collected for the purposes of the
research (Mouton, 2001). Consequently, there are limits on the level of control
which the researcher has over the data, and new insights are theoretical rather than
empirical in nature. However, such insights are imperative for the creation of new
models and theories as well as refinement of existing theoretical artefacts (Mason,
2002; Mouton, 2001).
1.6.2 Sampling
When selecting literature for a study relying on such research, the researcher should
take care to avoid sampling bias in terms of the literature which is selected for the
study (Babbie & Mouton, 2007; Mason, 2002; Mouton, 2001). This is particularly
true for the snowball sampling method which is often employed during this process.
Literature regarding DSSs for wicked problems was selected by means of a highly
rigorous methodology outlined by Gonzalez et al. (2006), Levy & Ellis (2006), and
Webster & Watson (2002).
1.6.3 Researcher Bias
The process of coding and model building in research, particularly in an interpretivist
paradigm, has the propensity to be highly subjective in nature (Babbie & Mouton,
2007). It therefore becomes the responsibility of the researcher to perform coding
in as rigorous a manner as can be reasonably expected, as well as to code the
literature in a systematic fashion underpinned by concrete definitions of concepts
utilised (Babbie & Mouton, 2007; Mouton, 2001).
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Figure 1.1: DSS and IS expansion as per Burstein & Holsapple (2008)
1.7 Relevance for IS Research and Practice
In order to effectively undertake research within the qualitative paradigm, context
becomes imperative in producing a holistic overview of the domain under investiga-
tion (Babbie & Mouton, 2007). Decision support systems are widely accepted in the
literature as a category of information system and are classified as such. It therefore
becomes pertinent to contextualise the DSS within the IS discipline, and to explore
its relevance for research and practice within the IS field.
DSSs are primarily defined as a specific variant of IS whose purpose is to support
and improve the decision making performance of managers or other information
and knowledge workers (Arnott & Pervan, 2005, 2008, 2014; Sprague, 1987). Here,
the standard view of IS as per Avison & Fitzgerald (2002) is employed, that is, a
computer-based system within an organisation that provides information as well as
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processes that are useful to the organisation in terms of helping said organisation
to operate more effectively.
Figure 1.1 outlines the context of DSSs within the scope of the IS field as per
Burstein & Holsapple (2008). Here, DSSs as a category of IS types are subjected
to similar forces of expansion to that of other information systems. From this
model, it is clear that DSSs are affected by forces such as organisational computing,
electronic commerce, and pervasive computing. Additionally, DSSs can be analysed
through the same lenses that are typically applied to ISs: conceptual, technical,
analytic, economic, and behavioural approaches. Finally, the same six reference
disciplines of IS research can be applied to DSS research and practice. Computer
science, strategic management, organisational behaviour, knowledge management,
operations management, and quantitative methods are inextricably implicated in
the growth of DSSs as a field, and are themselves impacted by this growth. Hence,
modern decision support is fundamentally multidisciplinary in nature, and requires
interaction with a wide range of approaches and theories (Burstein & Holsapple,
2008).
1.8 Organisation of this Thesis
The purpose of this chapter was to present an overview of the research context,
objectives, and research paradigm. The remainder of the thesis is structured as
follows:
Chapter 2 presents a selection of literature in the broad field of decision making
theory. The aim here is to contextualise the theoretical and pragmatic concerns of
decision making from the individual to organisational level.
Chapter 3 conceptualises and explores the notion of wicked problems within the
organisational context. The objective is to gain an understanding of wickedness, to
comprehend its significance for decision making within the organisation, as well as
to explore common approaches and their implications for the organisation.
Chapter 4 defines the concept of decision support systems in terms of their basic
characteristics and teleology, presents a historical overview of the field from two
salient perspectives in the literature, and details a number of prominent taxonomies
and frameworks presented in the literature during the lifetime of the field.
Chapter 5 presents the literature concerning the support of wicked problems by
means of DSSs. Additionally, the findings from the previous chapter are applied
in order to ascertain the direction of decision support for wicked problems in the
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field. An explanatory model for procedural decision support for wicked problems is
synthesised and elucidated.
Chapter 6 concludes the thesis by presenting the overarching findings and a num-
ber of associated observations. Additionally, the limitations of the research are also
addressed, and implications for research and practice are outlined. Finally, oppor-
tunities for further research in this area are established.
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Theories of Decision Making
2.1 Introduction
Hacking (1972, p. 186) describes decision theory as:
the theory of deciding what to do when it is uncertain what will happen.
Given an exhaustive list of possible hypotheses about the way the world
is, the observations or experimental data relevant to these hypotheses,
together with an inventory of possible decisions, and the various util-
ities of making these decisions in various possible states of the world:
determine the best decision.
Theories regarding decision making, therefore, address the nature of human decision
making under uncertainty in terms of the state of the world, possible modes of
action, consequences of these actions, and means through which each of the possible
consequences may be evaluated by decision makers.
The notion of decision making theory, in its broadest form, can be traced back to an-
cient Greek and Chinese philosophical discourses related to epistemology, ontology
and wisdom (Buchanan & O’ Connell, 2006; Peterson, 2009). The field itself has
been influenced by many diverse disciplines, including but not limited to economics,
cognitive psychology, mathematics, sociology, political science (Bennet & Bennet,
2008), philosophy, computer science, and statistics (Peterson, 2009). Consequently,
the literature related to decision making is both substantial in quantity and varied
in focus. A comprehensive analysis of all the literature from each perspective, while
fascinating, would prove unfeasible. Therefore, the aim of this chapter is to provide
a brief overview of the history of decision making as a discipline, as well as to elucid-
ate the themes and issues which have a notable relevance to decision support. The
11
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final section of this chapter compares and contrasts the two conceptions of ration-
ality presented by Simon (1976), known as substantive and procedural rationality
respectively.
2.2 A Note on Normative and Descriptive Theories
Prior to delving into specific theories of decision making, it is important to note
that the purposes of these theories may vary. One important distinction is that of
theories which are normative in nature, and those which endeavour to be descriptive,
also known as behavioural or positive theories.
Normative theories within a decision making paradigm are developed with the ob-
jective of informing decision makers how the process of reasoning, judgement and
decision making ought to occur, while descriptive theories aim to describe and elu-
cidate how people reason and act in reality (Over, 2004). These descriptive theories
are based on observation of decision makers and their behaviours (Baron, 2004).
Decision making theories can be divided into these two categories to reflect their
objective: to describe the actual or the ideal.
The definition of what constitutes normative theories of decision making is largely
dependent on the definition of rationality which is employed (Over, 2004). This
endeavour to develop a definition of rationality is largely a philosophical one, con-
sisting primarily of reflection and analysis (Baron, 2004). Over (2004) argues for a
view of rationality in decision making referred to as instrumental rationality, where
the rationality of an action is evaluated in terms of its likelihood to help a decision
maker achieve their own personal goals. This practical form of reasoning, therefore,
is concerned with selecting rational actions which correlate with one’s subjective de-
sires and preferences. This differs from the somewhat more conventional epistemic
view of rationality, which applies to the rationality of beliefs and inferences (Over,
2004). Normative models endeavour to evaluate actual decision making processes
and to improve them in order to close the gap between the normative and descript-
ive accounts of the process, through the development of prescriptive models (Baron,
2004).
2.3 A Brief History
According to Peterson (2009), the history of decision theory can be broken up into
three disparate phases in accordance with the time period represented by each.
These are elucidated in the subsections that follow.
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2.3.1 The Old Period
The first phase, known as the old period, refers to the period of academic study
rooted in ancient Greece. Despite the fact that this period did not involve formal
study regarding theories of decision making, it was clear to the Greeks that studying
and understanding decision making was an endeavour that warranted further inquiry
(Peterson, 2009).
The philosopher Herodotus spoke of the notion of rationality as an act which is right,
and irrationality as an act which is contrary to good counsel in Herodotus VII: 10
(Peterson, 2009). The rationality of an action was therefore viewed as an intrinsic
property that was independent of the consequences or outcomes of the action taken
(Carabelli, 2002).
In addition to Greek philosophers exploring ideas related to the concept of rational-
ity, others such as Aristotle grappled with the issues surrounding the logic of rational
preferences and the practical implications of such evaluations (Peterson, 2009; Hans-
son, 2002). Although a number of logical inconsistencies existed within Aristotle’s
own appraisal of such comparisons, along with the absence of a comprehension of
probability, the study of logic and its application in evaluating options was familiar
to ancient Greek philosophers (Peterson, 2009).
2.3.2 The Pioneering Period
The second phase, referred to as the pioneering period, outlines the phase of de-
cision making theory development which began in the 1600s during the Renaissance
(Bernstein, 1996), and ended in the early 1900s (Peterson, 2009). This phase is
characterised by an interest in the effects of probability on decision making.
This initial curiosity regarding probability began in 1654, when Blaise Pascal and
Pierre de Fermat commenced correspondence regarding the probability of specific
throws occurring, as generated by a pair of fair dice (Bernstein, 1996). This endeav-
our led to the development of mathematical solutions to such problems, which were
later published by Christian Huygens in 1657 (Peterson, 2009). From this collab-
oration, the theory of probability was synthesised, which meant that humans could
use numerical probabilities to forecast what might happen in the future and make
decisions accordingly for the first time in recorded history (Bernstein, 1996). Addi-
tionally, Pascal developed the argument, later known as Pascal’s Wager, which has
become widely accepted as the first instance of application of decision theory (Bern-
stein, 1996). This wager involved the problem of deciding whether or not to believe
in the existence of God, as represented by a coin toss game of chance (Bernstein,
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1996). Pascal further framed the problem as existing on an infinite time scale, and
providing no choice regarding one’s participation in the game (Hacking, 1972). In
terms of the stated decision problem, Pascal reasoned that it was better to choose to
believe in God, as the consequences of failing to believe in him were far more grave
if he does exist than the consequences of choosing to believe in him if he doesn’t
(Bernstein, 1996). Pascal also played a role regarding the notion of utility, or the
“strength of [one’s] desire for something” (Bernstein, 1996, p. 71), in the form of a
book published by a number of his associates. This book, known as La logique, ou
l’art de penser (Logic, or the art of thinking), also contained the first instance of
probability, named as such, and measured. Consequently, a decision was asserted to
be based on a combination of one’s strength of desire for a particular outcome, as
well as one’s degree of belief regarding the probability of that outcome (Bernstein,
1996).
Further insight regarding the notion of utility was developed by Swiss mathematician
David Bernoulli in a St. Petersburg paper published in 1738, during the height of
the Enlightenment intellectual era (Bernstein, 1996). In this paper, Bernoulli set
out to discover “rules [that] would be set up whereby anyone could estimate his pro-
spects from any risky undertaking in light of one’s specific financial circumstances”
(Bernstein, 1996, p. 110). From this process, Bernoulli produced two important con-
tributions to the development of decision theory. The first is that utility, rather than
the expected value, of a consequence is what rational decision makers will attempt
to maximise (Bernstein, 1996). The author further states that Bernoulli found this
utility to be based not purely on objective numeric values, but rather on subjective
intuition. The second contribution is that such a utility is inversely proportional
to the value of what is already possessed by the decision maker (Bernstein, 1996;
Peterson, 2009). Consequently, Bernoulli set in motion the revolutionary notion
that while the objective evaluation of risk will result in a specific expected value,
the subjective component of decision making is influenced by all of the stakeholders
involved in that decision due to their varying experiences of utility (Bernstein, 1996).
2.3.3 The Axiomatic Period
The third and final phase, known as the axiomatic phase, refers to the period
of decision making theory development which began in the early 1900s and still
largely defines the modern decision making landscape (Peterson, 2009). This phase
is marked by the “attempts to axiomatise the principles of rational decision making”
(Peterson, 2009, p. 13).
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Peterson (2009) asserts that this period in decision making theory history can be
traced back to two disparate origins. The first is that of philosopher Frank Ramsay’s
paper, Truth and Probability, published in 1931 following his death (Peterson, 2009).
This paper suggested that decision makers who act within the confines of eight
proposed decision axioms will behave in such a way that will be consistent with
the principle of maximisation of expected value (Peterson, 2009), due to implicit
attribution of numerical probabilities and utilities. The second point of origin of
this period is that of a book, Theory of Games and Economic Behavior, authored
by von Neumann and Morgenstern (Peterson, 2009) published in 1944. The book
presented the application of game theory, invented by von Neumann in 1926, to
economic and organisational decision making (Bernstein, 1996). It also dealt with
the decision maker’s implicit assignment of numerical utilities to outcomes with the
goal of maximising expected utility (Peterson, 2009).
The peak of the axiomatic period took place during the 1950s, resulting in a pleth-
ora of literature that formed much of the foundation for modern decision theory
(Peterson, 2009). This surge continued up until the 1990s and included many pro-
lific theorists. The contributions made by a number of these recent authors will be
addressed throughout the sections that follow.
2.4 Modern Contributions to Decision Theory
The previous section outlined the three major phases of decision making theory, as
identified by Peterson (2009). The aim of the sections that follow is to identify and
elucidate a number of the primary contributions to decision theory originating in
the present, axiomatic period.
2.4.1 Rational Choice Theory
According to March (1994), the depiction of decision making as rational is common
in the decision making literature as well as in regular human expectation. This
is partially due to the illusion of such a conclusion as being self-evident in nature
(Simon, 1979), and therefore being accepted more readily. Consequently, a number
of theories presupposing the notion of human rationality exist in the literature.
2.4.1.1 Defining Rationality
In order to explore the notion of rational theories of choice, it would be beneficial
to define what is specifically intended by the term rationality in decision making
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Table 2.1: Common conceptions of rationality as per March (1994)
Conception of Rationality Perspective Employed
Success The desirability of the outcomes of actions taken
Coldness Attitude towards the decision taken
Sanity State of mind of the decision maker taking the decision,
as reflected by the actions taken in taking the decision
theory. According to March (1994), rationality has three common interpretations
and associated perspectives in decision making as summarised in Table 2.1.
Although many of these conceptions appear sensible in the context within which they
are used, the conception of rationality employed in this thesis is in alignment with
the definition invoked by March (1994). This conception refers to what is known
as procedural rationality, which is defined as a specific set of procedures utilised in
making choices (March, 1994). In this way, the rationality of a process is separated
from the intelligence or success of its outcomes, which March (1994) refers to as
substantive rationality.
2.4.1.2 Features of Rational Choice Theories
According to March (1994), rational choice theories operate within the framework
of the logic of consequences. This is due to the alleged propensity of decision makers
to act in accordance with how they anticipate their actions will affect future states
of the world; in other words, the perceived future consequences of present actions.
Further, he asserts, alternative actions are appraised on the basis of how these
consequences indulge the preferences of the decision maker. Therefore, rational
decision processes are consequence as well as preference-based.
The structure of the logic of consequences, as delineated by March (1994), is framed
in terms of four specific parameters:
• Alternatives — the actions that are available to the decision maker.
• Expectations — the prospective consequences of each alternative, along with
associated probabilities of each consequence.
• Preferences — the decision maker’s conception of the value of each consequence
connected to an alternative.
• Decision rule — the means by which the decision maker chooses between
the available alternatives with cognisance of the value of each of their con-
sequences.
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Table 2.2: Assumptions of pure rationality as per Simon (1955)
Parameter Assumption
Alternatives Decision maker is omniscient regarding the set of altern-
atives that are available.
Expectations Decision maker possesses perfect knowledge or the ca-
pacity to ascertain the consequences of each available
alternative.
Preferences Decision maker’s preferences are consistent.
Decision Rule Decision maker possesses sufficient computational skill to
permit determination of which alternative will result in
the greatest utility in light of the decision maker’s prefer-
ences and expectations.
Within this framework, decision making is analysed in terms of these parameters.
However, the framework also includes what March (1994) refers to as two guesses
about the future world on which the choice is reliant: the nature of the future states
of the world that each alternative might create, and the decision maker’s future
evaluation of each of these possible states. Further, the choice is also dependent on
the alternatives which are actually considered by the decision maker.
Assumptions regarding the nature of the four parameters and their interactions vary
among the various existing theories of rational choice. The sections that follow will
examine a number of the more prominent categories of rational choice theories that
exist in the literature.
2.4.1.3 Pure Rational Choice
The most basic form of pure rationality assumes that the decision maker has perfect
knowledge of all alternatives as well as their consequences, and that the decision
maker possesses a consistent set of preferences (March, 1994). Consequently, in this
view, decision makers are said to select the alternative that maximises their expected
utility.
The most basic form of pure rationality, as delineated by Simon (1955), makes a
number of substantial assumptions regarding the nature of the decision maker and
the environment. These assumptions are described in the context of the aforemen-
tioned parameters involved in the logic of consequences framework March (1994) in
Table 2.2.
Although there exists a widespread acknowledgement that pure theories of rational
choice exhibit characteristics which seem intuitive (Simon, 1979), it has become ap-
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parent that such theories are neither accurate descriptions of reality, nor are they
useful guidelines for how decisions should be made (March, 1978). As Simon elo-
quently puts it, these theories satisfy the simplicity criterion of Occam’s razor, but
make substantial assumptions regarding human decision making capabilities and
are therefore difficult to accept (Simon, 1979). According to Simon (1979), the
model particularly breaks down under circumstances involving some degree of un-
certainty. Further, Simon (1955) states that constraints introduced through human
physiological and cognitive limitations reveal a form of human rationality which is
rudimentary as best.
2.4.1.4 Expected Utility Theory
The literature comprising both philosophical examinations as well as empirical in-
vestigations of pure rational choice theories conclude that such theories are inad-
equate for describing how decisions are made in reality (March, 1978, 1994). Con-
sequently, a number of elaborations of rational choice theory were developed in order
to accommodate empirical findings, the most prominent of which is the incorpora-
tion of uncertainty regarding consequences of alternatives (March, 1994). One such
modification of rational choice theory is the notion of expected utility theory (EUT),
which is the focus of this section.
The notion of utility, as discussed in Section 2.3.2, was initially formalised and
described by Daniel Benoulli during the pioneering period of decision making his-
tory (Bernstein, 1996). The concept was further elucidated and adapted by von
Neumann and Morgenstern in 1944 with their work on game theory (Friedman &
Savage, 1952). EUT is an extension of the original notion of utility postulated by
Benoulli in the following terms: firstly, decision makers will seek to maximise utility
in selecting alternatives; and second, evaluation of the probability associated with
each consequence has an effect on this choice. It further states that the decision
maker chooses between alternatives that have uncertain consequences by comparing
their expected utility values (Friedman & Savage, 1952; Mongin, 1997). Numeric-
ally, this is asserted to refer to the weighted sum of each outcome’s subjective utility
value multiplied by that outcome’s associated probability (Mongin, 1997). The the-
ory has been based on four principles outlined by Tversky & Kahneman (1986) in
the context of decision makers choosing between lotteries or gambles. These are
summarised in Table 2.3.
If the decision maker complies with these principles, such a decision maker is asserted
to comply with the criteria for rationality from a normative perspective (Tversky
& Kahneman, 1986). The authors also state that these principles can be ordered
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Table 2.3: Principles of expected utility theory as per Tversky & Kahneman (1986)
Principle Elucidation
Cancellation If A>B, then A if it rains >B if it rains.
States which yield different outcomes should be the only states
which affect the choice between options.
Transitivity If A>B and B>C, then A>C.
If a decision maker must choose among three lotteries, if the
first is preferred over the second, and the second is preferred
over the third, then the first will always be preferred over the
third.
Dominance If an option is evaluated as being better than another in at least
one state, and at least as good as the other option in all other
states, then that dominant option should be chosen.
Invariance A preference for a particular option should persist independ-
ently of the choice problem’s representation or description.
from the least normatively accepted, to the principle which has the highest normative
acceptance amongst scholars. This hierarchy is reflected in the aforementioned table,
with the most normatively accepted principles appearing later in the list.
In addition to the principles postulated by Tversky & Kahneman (1986), EUT as
a descriptive theory, makes a number of assumptions regarding human psychology.
These, described by Katsikopoulos & Gigerenzer (2008), are as follows:
• Every alternative can be appraised in terms of an inherent numeric value,
which allow the alternative to be evaluated independently of other options.
• The aforementioned value of a given alternative is computed in terms of all
available information, e.g., probabilities and other values of outcomes.
• In calculating an alternative’s value, a low score for a particular attribute can
be substituted by a higher score on another attribute.
Despite the relatively ubiquitous normative acceptance of EUT, the theory has been
challenged on a descriptive level due to the inherent difficulty in assigning numerical
values to both utility as well as outcome probabilities (Friedman & Savage, 1952;
Kahneman & Tversky, 1979; Mongin, 1997). Indeed, the pioneering work, Neumann
& Morgenstern (1953), admits to much of the controversy, but nevertheless elects
to operate with the assumption that representative numbers for these constructs do
exist. Further, studies postulating theories such as the Ellsberg paradox (Ellsberg,
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Table 2.4: Actual limited human rationality as per Simon (1979)
Parameter Actual Behaviour
Alternatives Decision maker has limited knowledge regarding the set of al-
ternatives that are available.
Expectations Decision maker does not necessarily know or consider the con-
sequences of each alternative.
Preferences Decision maker’s preferences are typically inconsistent, and are
not utilised in parallel during a decision.
Decision Rule Decision maker does not always attempt to maximise utility, but
attempts to find a solutions which is viewed as good enough.
1961), prospect theory (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979), the Allais paradox (Allais,
1979), and the framing effect (Tversky & Kahneman, 1981, 1986) have empiric-
ally demonstrated how actual decision making in the context of gamble selection
consistently violates the principles of EUT. Consequently, much of the literature
has relegated expected utility theory to the realm of normative rather than beha-
vioural theories of human decision making (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979; Mongin,
1997). However, as Kahneman & Tversky (1979) have asserted, it is probable that
theories of decision making cannot claim to possess both normative suitability and
descriptive veracity.
2.4.2 Bounded Rationality
The previous sections have discussed a number of variations of rational choice theory.
Underlying the bulk of these and related theories is the assumption that humans pos-
sess the ability to behave in a manner that is almost perfectly rational. However, as
March (1994) asserts, studies of actual decision making behaviour demonstrate that
many of these assumptions are not supported by empirical evidence. Rather, human
decision makers tend to treat each parameter comprising the logic of consequences
as demonstrated in Table 2.4.
Simon (1979, p. 502) asserts that humans do not behave rationally, as human ra-
tionality “falls short of omniscience”. This is due to lack of knowledge regarding the
alternatives that are available, as well as cognitive limitations that complicate the
ability of human decision makers to compute the likelihood of consequences. These
limitations include constraints on capabilities for attention; and storing, organising,
and sharing information (March, 1994). In order to address the obvious discrep-
ancies between normative and descriptive conceptions of human-decision making,
Simon (1955) introduced the notion of bounded rationality.
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Although human rationality falls far short of the requirements for rational beha-
viour, March (1994) states that bounded rationality assumes that human decision
makers are at least intendedly rational. Consequently, human decision makers em-
ploy a number of strategies in order to cope with these constraints. The key strategy
outlined by Simon specifically relates to the notion of search and satisficing. Clas-
sical conceptions of rational choice theory argue that human decision makers seek
to maximise utility according to a predefined utility curve. Bounded rationality,
conversely, asserts that humans satisfice, or terminate the search for alternatives
once an alternative has been discovered that is deemed good enough rather than
optimal (Simon, 1979). The measure of goodness of an alternative is determined by
the decision maker’s aspiration, which is in flux rather than static.
The notion of bounded rationality, as elucidated by Simon (1955), was later shown
to match up to actual decision making behaviour in a number of empirical studies
(Simon, 1979). Consequently, it has been extended, elaborated upon, as well as
incorporated into alternative views of rationality and contemporary theories (March,
1978). Examples include the notion of heuristics as a means to adaptively cope with
this bounded rationality (Gigerenzer, 2004) as well as the theory of the garbage can
model to explain organisational decision making behaviour (Cohen et al., 1972).
2.4.3 Prospect Theory
Expected utility theory, as discussed in Section 2.4.1.4, dominated the field of de-
cision making under risk for a number of years, from both a normative and descript-
ive perspective (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979). However, authors such as Simon
(1955) and Kahneman & Tversky (1979) argue that decision makers do not con-
form to the axioms and principles of expected utility. Kahneman & Tversky (1979),
in particular, demonstrate that human decision making behaviour is incongruent
with these tenets. In order to account for these deviations, these authors developed
prospect theory as an alternative descriptive model for decisions under risk.
As with EUT, prospect theory presents simple prospects with financial outcomes
and associated explicit probabilities, but Kahneman & Tversky (1979) argue that
it can be expanded to address choices with greater degrees of complexity. Prospect
theory divides the decision making process into two phases, namely, editing and
evaluation, each of which consist of a number of operations. The process is outlined
and described in the subsections that follow.
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2.4.3.1 Editing
The primary purpose of the editing phase is to reorganise and codify the available
options in order to facilitate the later process of evaluating these options (Kahne-
man & Tversky, 1979). This is achieved through the utilisation of six operations
elucidated by (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979):
• Coding — this operation entails the categorisation of outcomes as gains or
losses against a particular reference point. This is due to the assertion by pro-
spect theory that decision makers view outcomes as gains or losses rather than
final states of welfare following the outcome. This appraisal of the outcomes
as gains or losses is affected by the formulation of the prospect as well as any
expectations on the part of the decision maker.
• Combination — combining outcomes that have identical probabilities in or-
der to simplify prospects. The example provided by the authors is that the
prospect (200, 0.25; 200, 0.25)1 will be combined and evaluated as (200, 0.5)2.
• Segregation — this involves the separation of the risk-less component of a
prospect from the risky element, if such a distinction does indeed exist within
the current prospect. For example, the prospect (300, 0.80; 200, 0.20) will be
segregated into a certain gain 200 along with the risky prospect (100, 0.80)3.
• Cancellation — components which are common to two prospects are dis-
carded prior to evaluating the two prospects. For example, A = (200, 0.20;
100, 0.50; −50, 0.30) versus B = (200, 0.20; 150, 0.50; −100, 0.30) will be re-
duced to a choice between the prospects (100, 0.50; −50, 0.30) and (150, 0.50;
−100, 0.30)4.
• Simplification — the rounding of probabilities and outcomes; this can sub-
sequently lead to the disposal of excessively improbable outcomes.
• Dominance detection — this involves the appraisal of available prospects with
the goal of identifying alternatives that are completely overshadowed by other
dominant options, and rejecting such alternatives.
1Prospects are presented as group of values and their corresponding probabilities enclosed within
parentheses. Commas represent the break between value and probability, while semicolons denote
the break between groups of prospects.
2Here, the decision maker combines the two probabilities of each prospect due to their having
the same gain value.
3The decision maker has interpreted the value of 200 as a certain gain as both gains exceed this
value, and therefore segregates the 0.2 probability and attaches it 100 gain remaining.
4Here, the decision maker simply discards the common gain-probability pair.
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These editing operations are executed whenever the decision maker is able to do so;
the order in which these are carried out may therefore assist or hinder the execution
of further operations on the options (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979). Upon completion
of the editing phase, the decision maker enters the evaluation phase.
2.4.3.2 Evaluation
The evaluation phase involves the process whereby the decision maker evaluates each
of the edited prospects with the goal of choosing the prospect which brings about
the highest value according to the decision maker (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979).
The first component of the evaluation phase involves the consideration of outcomes
in terms of probability weights, or decision weights based partially on probabilities
(Barberis, 2013). This is utilised in conjunction with the subjective values of each
outcome uncovered in the second component of evaluation (Kahneman & Tversky,
1979). The process of evaluating and choosing an outcome occurs in terms of four
important principles of prospect theory (Barberis, 2013).
• Reference dependence — humans do not experience utility from final states
of wealth, but rather from gains or losses that occur relative to a particular,
predefined reference point.
• Loss aversion — humans are far more sensitive to losses than to gains that
are of the same significance. This is true for minuscule as well as larger losses.
• Diminishing sensitivity — humans tend to behave in a risk-averse fashion
for moderate probability gains, but in a risk-seeking fashion where losses are
concerned5.
• Probability weighting — humans do not weight consequences by means of their
objective probabilities, but rather by decision weights, or probabilities which
have been transformed by a weighting function. This weighting function over-
weights low probabilities and underweights higher probabilities.
2.4.4 Heuristics and Biases
The area of decision making research concerned with heuristics and biases was es-
tablished in the early 1970s by Tversky & Kahneman (1974). A heuristic, often
referred to as a rule of thumb (Keren & Teigen, 2004), is a type of rule that is
5A modified example of this principle is that an individual would prefer a certain gain of R500
to a 50 percent chance of R1 000, but would prefer a 50 percent chance of losing R1 000 to definitely
losing R500.
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simple in nature due to its reliance or natural cognitive ability, ecological in terms
of being domain-specific by exploiting the environment, and focuses on the process
rather than merely the outcome of problem-solving behaviour (Gigerenzer, 2004). In
this way, heuristics reduce the effort of decision making by considering fewer cues,
simplifying the process of cue value retrieval and cue weighting, reducing the in-
formation integrated into the problem, and eventually evaluating fewer alternatives
(Gigerenzer & Gaissmaier, 2011).
Gigerenzer (2004) elucidates a model of decision making which is purely descriptive
in nature, and which the author concedes as existing within the borders of bounded
rationality. The construct which acts as the cornerstone or foundation for the the-
ory is that of heuristics. Unlike Tversky & Kahneman (1974), Gigerenzer (2004)
argues that heuristics are rational in particular environmental contexts. This ecolo-
gical rationality allows decision makers to make quick decisions without resorting to
probabilities and utilities, and with limited information. He argues that this model
is both descriptive and prescriptive in scope, as it focuses both on which heuristics
humans use, as well as the contexts within which the heuristic strategy should be
preferred over the associated statistical method.
Keren & Teigen (2004) have asserted that current research related to heuristics and
biases has the effect of increasing the number of heuristics and biases discovered.
He goes on to state his opinion regarding the unfortunate nature of the research
performed on the area as having paired heuristics almost inextricably with biases,
resulting in the assumption that heuristics are directly associated with producing a
particular bias.
The sections that follow will discuss the three most common heuristics delineated
in the literature: representativeness, availability, and adjustment.
2.4.4.1 Representativeness
The representativeness heuristic, according to Tversky & Kahneman (1974), refers to
the evaluation of a probability through the degree to which that element is perceived
to be representative of a particular category. Therefore, they assert, the probability
of object A belonging to category B is judged to be high if A is believed to be highly
representative of B. The same is true in reverse; if A is perceived to be dissimilar
to B, then the probability of object A belonging to category B is judged to be high.
An illustration similar to that postulated by Tversky & Kahneman (1974) follows
below.
Consider a person who has been described as follows: “Lindsay is a loud, lively,
and dramatic young women with a penchant for colourful and bohemian makeup
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
CHAPTER 2. THEORIES OF DECISION MAKING 25
and dress. She is outgoing, sociable, though slightly disorganised and often late for
meetings.” The crux of the illustration involves the presentation of a list of possible
occupations that Lindsay may currently be engaged in, and asking individuals to
assess the probability of each. Examples could include that of engineer, computer
scientist, farmer, marine, actress, or teacher. According to the representative heur-
istic, the probability that Lindsay holds each position will be assessed according to
the degree to which she is believed to be representative of the individual’s stereo-
type of that particular vocation (Tversky & Kahneman, 1974). In this particular
example, the probability of Lindsay being an actress may be interpreted as being
fairly high, due to a particular cultural stereotype involving the personality traits
and behaviour of individuals involved in the dramatic arts.
Although some degree of representativeness may assist in assessing probability, over-
reliance on this heuristic can lead to serious errors in judgement as representative-
ness of one object in terms of another does not necessarily increase probability of
that categorisation. A number of biases may result in the overestimation of such
probabilities. These are summarised, along with illustrative examples in Table 2.5.
2.4.4.2 Availability
According to Tversky & Kahneman (1974), the availability heuristic pertains to the
tendency of humans to assess the probability of an event by the mental accessibility
of such an event, or the level of ease with which manifestations can be conceived of
in the mind. This is illustrated, in a similar fashion to that of an example postu-
lated by the authors, by the estimation of the probability of aviation accidents and
fatalities as being high amidst the individual’s knowledge of a current, random spate
of aviation calamities. In this instance, the individual may estimate the probability
of an aviation accident as being high due to availability, or the fact that he or she
could easily bring these recent incidents to mind. Similarly to the representativeness
heuristic, availability of an event or object does not necessitate a higher probability,
and may therefore lead the individual toward biased judgements. These biases are
outlined in Table 2.6.
2.4.4.3 Adjustment and Anchoring
Tversky & Kahneman (1974) assert that the adjustment and anchoring heuristic
involves the adjustment of an initial starting value or anchor in making estimates.
This anchor may be generated due to the formulation of the decision problem or
incomplete calculations related to the problem. According to the authors, the ad-
justment is not sufficient to overcome the effect of anchoring, which results in a bias
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The propensity of humans to
ignore prior probabilities of
events in favour of probabil-
ities derived from representat-
iveness.
With reference to the example
involving Lindsay, individuals
may choose to ignore the base-
rate information that 20 percent
of the sample are actresses, es-
timating that Lindsay is an act-




The belief that small samples
of events should directly ex-
hibit the randomness which
is inherent in the greater
random processes generating
these events.
In the event of six coin tosses,
where H=heads and T=tails, the
combination of HTHTHT is just
as likely as TTHTHH.
Expecting chance to
be self-correcting
The belief that if a particu-
lar event has not occurred for
some time, that it becomes
more probable as that event
has become overdue. This is
due to the mistaken assump-
tion that random chance has
a memory of prior events.
This bias is illustrated through
the concept of lottery numbers,
where participants may believe
that the absence of a particular
number in previous lottery draws
increases the likelihood of that




Humans expect the occur-
rence of an extreme event
to be followed by similarly
extreme events, despite the
maxim that events tend to re-
gress to the average.
A classic example of such be-
haviour is that of an individual
experiencing the extremely un-
likely event of winning two con-
secutive roulette games and ex-




The overestimation of two
events occurring simultan-
eously as opposed to either
one of those same events
occurring in isolation.
Presenting an individual named
“Linda” in such a way that she
appears to belong to two sets,
e.g. Bank teller and femin-
ist. According to probability the-
ory, the probability of her being
either a bank teller or feminist
alone should outweigh the prob-
ability of her belonging to both
categories. However, individuals
tend to overestimate the latter.
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
CHAPTER 2. THEORIES OF DECISION MAKING 27
Table 2.6: Biases related to the availability heuristic as per Goodwin & Wright
(2009)
Bias Elucidation Example
Ease of recall An individual may overestim-
ate the probability of an event
due to the ease with which
similar events can be recalled.
News bulletins reporting and
highlighting the details of excep-
tionally rare events may lead to
overestimation of these events.
Ease of imagination An individual may, similarly,
overestimate the probability
of an event due to the ease
with which the event can be
imagined.
A project manager overestimat-
ing the probability of a project
running late due to the ease with
which circumstances leading to
project delay can be envisioned.
Illusory correlation The propensity of an indi-
vidual to overestimate the pre-
valence of events co-occurring,
often due to a pre-conception.
A factory manager overestimat-
ing the probability of foreign
goods being defective as op-
posed to local goods due to the
pre-conceived notion that foreign
goods are less reliable.
towards this initial value. The types of bias that may occur are listed and elucidated
in Table 2.7.
2.4.4.4 The Adaptive Toolbox
As outlined above, not all research supports the notion of heuristics as mere side-
effects of faulty cognition that invariably produce biases in reasoning. Indeed, a
number of authors criticise this perspective due to scepticism regarding the valid-
ity of laboratory-based experiments, where real-world empirical studies have shown
more favourable results (Goodwin & Wright, 2009). The aim of this section is to
address one such alternative perspective on heuristics.
In the midst of the discourse around heuristics and biases, the notion of heuristics as
tools that arise out of the human state of bounded rationality, and that allow such
individuals to make decisions quickly and with limited resources emerged (Giger-
enzer, 2004). The authors conceptualise heuristics as a particular type of rule that
exhibits three specific characteristics:
1. Heuristics leverage cognitive abilities that are either biologically innate or have
been learnt by the organism. This characteristic is demonstrated in the ability
of humans to visually track a moving object against a visually distracting
background; young infants have the ability to direct their attention to moving
objects through their gaze. This emphasises the simple nature of heuristics.
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The difficulty displayed by in-
dividuals in adjusting upwards
or downwards from an anchor.
This can occur even if the an-
chor is quite obviously irrelev-
ant to the decision problem.
Asking participants to estim-
ate any probability following the
generation of a random number
results in this random number
acting as the anchor and having




Conjunctive events are of the
form (A AND B). Individuals
tend to anchor on one of the
co-occurring events and make
insufficient adjustments from
this point. This results in the
decision maker overestimating
the probability of conjunctive
events.
Estimating the failure tolerance
of a system with the knowledge
of the probability of success of
the points results in individuals
anchoring on this probability and
ignoring the fact that these prob-
abilities should be multiplied to-





Similar to conjunctive events,
but of the form (A OR B).
Individuals tend to anchor on
one of the disjunctive events
if asked to estimate the prob-
ability of either one of them
happening. This results in an
underestimation of disjunctive
events.
The probability of a chemical
plant failing may be underes-
timated if a decision maker is
informed that any of the ten
subsystems of the plant failing
(1/100 probability each) will lead
to the entire plant failing.
Overconfidence When estimating confidence
intervals, individuals tend to
anchor on the most likely
value that they expect a par-
ticular variable to assume.
This is because humans tend
to be overconfident that their
selected range will actually
contain the value.
Project managers may estimate
that a project will take between
27 and 33 hours with 99% prob-
ability due to the belief that the
most likely value is 3 hours. Such
an individual may then be sur-
prised when the actual value falls
out of that range.
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The objective of developing theories involving the adaptive toolbox
is to comprehend the nature of decision making in actual human be-
haviour rather than implausible scenarios involving unlimited know-
ledge, capabilities and resources
Domain spe-
cificity
The heuristics within the adaptive toolbox are domain-specific as op-
posed to generic. The cognitive and emotional building blocks that
comprise these heuristics, however, are general in nature.
Ecological ra-
tionality
The variant of rationality involved in applying heuristics is not a form
of optimisation, but of the extent of the fit between the heuristic
employed and the structure of the environment.
2. Heuristics also leverage core structures of the environment in which the or-
ganism is present. Rather than heuristics being logical in the strictly rational
sense, they are ecological in nature. Consequently, heuristics are not meas-
ured normatively and in isolation, but rather as a function of the environ-
ment. Accordingly, this demonstrates the ability of the environment to allow
an employed heuristic the be characterised as smart.
3. Heuristics are not merely the outward result of inward optimisation calcu-
lations. Organisms do not employ unconscious, mathematical optimisation
methods while applying heuristics.
Gigerenzer (2002) later developed the notion of the adaptive toolbox in order to
provide a framework for heuristic solutions to decision problems. The adaptive tool-
box is a construct that refers to heuristics themselves, the building blocks of which
they are comprised, as well as the cognitive abilities that they exploit (Gigerenzer
& Gaissmaier, 2011). The goal of the adaptive toolbox is to achieve proximal goals,
through provision of cognitive, emotional and social strategies, by making quick and
frugal decisions (Gigerenzer, 2002). This notion of the adaptive toolbox is based on
three premises delineated by (Gigerenzer, 2002) in Table 2.8.
A number of tools with various functions exist within the adaptive toolbox. Giger-
enzer (2002) lists three major functions of the building blocks of heuristics: search
rules, stopping rules, and decision rules. Search rules involve the search for altern-
atives and cues to assess the alternatives. Conversely, stopping rules involve the
ceasing of search strategies, while decision rules refer to the actual decision which is
made based on the alternatives and cues collected during search.
































Table 2.9: Models of heuristics as per Gigerenzer & Gaissmaier (2011)
Heuristic Group Heuristic Elucidation Examples Real-World Empirical Studies
Recognition-based
decision making
Recognition If, out of two alternatives, one is recog-
nised over the other for a particular cri-
terion, ascribe a higher value to that al-
ternative in terms of that criterion.
Recognition of Swiss cities is an accurate
predictor of the population within that
city.
This heuristic has been successfully employed in predicting
Wimbledon tennis match results Serwe & Frings (2006),
state election results in Germany (Gaissmaier & Marewski,
2011), and consumer product preferences (Hoyer & Brown,
1990).
Fluency If, out of two alternatives, both are re-
cognised for a given criterion, but one is
recognised more quickly, ascribe a higher
value to that alternative.
Taking the first option that comes to
mind in handball players who were asked
which move they would have performed
in the context of a particular video re-
cording produced, on average, better res-
ults than later options.
Alter & Oppenheimer (2006) alleges that this heuristic may
predict stock performance. In this experiment, a basket
of more fluently named stocks tended to outperform less
fluently named stocks in the short term.
One-reason decision
making
One-clever-cue Relying on one specific cue in order to
locate alternatives.
The catching of fly balls in baseball and
cricket by means of the gaze heuristic.
The circle heuristic, which is merely the imposition of a
circle through the two most distant sites of a serial crim-
inal’s crime locations in geographical profiling was shown
to predict the location of the criminal more accurately than
complex statistical software (Snook et al., 2005).
Take-the-best Search amongst cues in order of how
valid they are, stopping once the first
cue discriminating among the two is en-
countered. Ascribe the alternative with
the higher cue value with the higher value
in terms of the criterion.
When laypeople, police, and professional
burglars are asked to give their opinion
regarding which of two houses were most
likely to be burgled, both sets of experts’
responses were most accurately depicted
by take-the-best.
The heuristic can be more predictively accurate than linear
multiple regression models (Czerlinski et al., 1999) as well
as non-linear strategies (Brighton & Gigerenzer, 2012).
Take-the-best was found to be as accurate, or more so, than
Bayesian models for literature search for a particular topic
of interest (Lee et al., 2002).
Fast-and-frugal-
trees
Search amongst cues in a predefined se-
quence, stopping as soon as a particu-
lar cue results in an outlet. The object
should then be classified according to this
order and exit.
These trees are often utilised in order to
arrive at medical diagnoses.
These trees were found to be more accurate in predicting
potential heart attacks in emergency room patients than
the heart disease predictive instrument (HDPI), reduced
physicians’ false-alarm rate by 50 percent, and had a higher
usability for doctors than the statistical method (Green &
Mehr, 1997).
Magistrate decisions were more accurately predicted using
fast-and-frugal trees than weighting and summing all in-
formation (Dhami, 2003).
Continued on next page
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Table 2.9 – Continued from previous page
Heuristic Group Heuristic Elucidation Examples Real-World Empirical Studies
Trade-off heuristics Tallying Search amongst cues in whichever fash-
ion, stopping once m out of M cues
have been found (1<m<=M). Choose
the alternative that was preferred by the
greater number of cues.
Avoiding avalanche accidents while hik-
ing or skiing in snow by matching ob-
served cues with known cues that serve
as a warning for avalanches.
The aforementioned skiing cues would have prevented 92
percent of historical avalanche accidents if implemented ret-
rospectively in those cases for which the heuristic would
have been applicable (McCammon & Ha¨geli, 2007).
Mapping model Taking the median criterion value of ob-
jects that have an identical number of
positive cues.
The prosecution ascertaining, weighting
and aggregating factors relevant to crim-
inal sentencing in order to recommend a
sentence to a judge.
The best prediction of sentences in theft, fraud, and for-
gery cases was found to be the mapping model utilising
the aforementioned heuristic (Von Helversen & Rieskamp,
2009).
1/N rule Resources should be allocated uniformly
amongst N alternatives.
Splitting a sum of money equally
amongst participants in a game.
This strategy is the most frequent one utilised in children’s
group decision processes despite the predictions postulated
by game theoretic models (Takezawa et al., 2006).
Dividing financial resources equally across N investment op-
tion proved the superior strategy in terms of certainty of
returns and the second,with regards to turnover (DeMiguel
et al., 2007).
Social intelligence Social heuristics Leveraging the knowledge of crowds, par-
ticularly when the decision maker lacks
adequate knowledge.
Imitating or averaging the judgement of
groups of people in order to exploit the
wisdom inherent in these groups.
Galton (1907) found that when villagers at a livestock fair
estimated the weight of individual oxen, that the median of
these guesses only differed from the actual weights by nine
pounds, and the mean by one pound.
Moral behaviour Unconscious behaviour, such as peer im-
itation, in order to be accepted within a
particular group context.
A rule of intuitive search that enables one
to locate information that one has been
deceived or unfairly treated in the con-
text of a social contract.
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In order to actually test how well heuristics perform in the real world, Gigerenzer
(2004) asserts that heuristics must be formally modelled. Following formalisation
of a number of heuristics, it was discovered that, contrary to classical laboratory
experiments, these heuristics perform better than statistical methods that make
use of the same or a greater quantity of information (Gigerenzer & Gaissmaier,
2011). These models of heuristics as per the aforementioned authors are presented
in Table 2.9.
Much of the current and future research in heuristics entails investigation of the
effectiveness of heuristics in the real-world, as well as the study of the building blocks
of heuristics, and the natural and cognitive structures they exploit (Gigerenzer &
Gaissmaier, 2011).
2.4.5 Organisational Decision Theories
The majority of the decision making theories delineated thus far have dealt with de-
cision making processes appropriate for the individual decision maker, rather than
groups of individuals. The objective of this section is to address perspectives of
human decision making that relate to the processes which take place within organ-
isations. This will be achieved through the discussion of two distinct perspectives
on organisational decision making described by Pinfield (1986): the structured per-
spective and the anarchic or garbage can perspective.
2.4.5.1 Structured Perspective
The structured perspective on organisational decision making is fundamentally based
on the assumption that apparently unstructured decision processes are actually
structured in nature (Pinfield, 1986). This alleged structure arises through the ba-
sic three-phase process of decision making as elucidated by Herbert Simon (Pinfield,
1986), but with a number of modifications proposed by Mintzberg et al. (1976).
Each stage comprises a number of routines, each of which function as the basic
elements or building blocks of the decision process. The supposed complexity, the
authors argue, emerges from the interactions between stages, as well as the iterative
nature of the progression between them. The nature of these stages is demonstrated
by the general model developed by Mintzberg et al. (1976) and illustrated in Figure
2.1; each of these will be elucidated in the sections that follow.
The first phase of the decision making process is referred to as the identification
phase. This phase fundamentally involves the recognition of the existence of an
opportunity for a decision, as well as the conceptualisation of this decision problem
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Figure 2.1: The structured decision process as per Mintzberg et al. (1976)
(Pinfield, 1986). The two routines comprising this phase, according to Mintzberg
et al. (1976), are as follows:
• Recognition routine — involves the recognition of the gap between some set of
information and a particular perceived standard. The three typical types of de-
cisions which may arise from a given situation could be problem, opportunity,
or crisis types of decisions, each dictated by particular stimuli.
• Diagnosis routine — follows directly from the recognition routine once the
threshold level is reached for the accumulation of stimuli. This process involves
the initiation of the actual decision process, as well as the acquisition and
allocation of resources to be utilised during the decision process. This diagnosis
is not always made explicit, and it might not even exist to a significant degree
in particular types of decision processes.
The second phase of the decision making process, development, involves the process
of searching for or development of solutions that are deemed suitable for the decision
problem or opportunity under analysis (Pinfield, 1986). This is also the phase during
which the greatest quantity of decision making resources are expended (Mintzberg
et al., 1976). The two primary routines that exist within this phase are search and
design (Mintzberg et al., 1976), and are elucidated below.
• Search routine — involves the process of seeking out solutions which already
exist. The process is contended as being hierarchical in nature, with early
failures in passive means of search giving rise to more active search behaviours.
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An ultimate perceived failure in the search routine is hypothesised to lead to
engagement of the design routine in order to derive a custom solution.
• Design routine — involves the iterative design of one or more custom solutions,
or the modification of an existing solution following termination of the search
routine. Most frequently, a single design is developed due to the high costs
associated with design of solutions in organisations.
Selection is the final phase of the structured organisational decision process, and
involves the filtering, analysis, evaluation, and negotiation that results in the se-
lection of a particular alternative (Pinfield, 1986). The associated routines, as per
Mintzberg et al. (1976), are:
• Screen routine — involves reducing the number of alternatives available by
eliminating those alternatives which are deemed infeasible. This is a strategy
that is often implemented with the goal of managing an abundance of altern-
atives following search.
• Evaluation-choice routine — the process of evaluating alternatives and choos-
ing among them. This process is asserted to occur using one of three modes:
judgement, bargaining and analysis. Judgement is cited as the most frequently
used mode, as it involves a swift, convenient individual choice based on the de-
cision maker’s own intuitions. Bargaining involves an element of the judgement
mode, but rather involves a group of decision makers with conflicting values
and goals exercising their individual judgements. Analysis, the most studied
mode of evaluation and choice, involves the systematic, objective evaluation
of alternatives and ensuing managerial judgement or bargaining exercise.
• Authorisation routine — the routine that decisions must follow when the de-
cision maker is not authorised to make a commitment on behalf of the organ-
isation. The decision is then approved through progressive movement up the
hierarchy, usually following the evaluation-choice routine, although authorisa-
tion may be sought at any stage of the decision process.
In addition to the routines included in the various phases of the decision process,
there exist three sets of supporting routines which aim to support these phases
(Mintzberg et al., 1976). According to the authors, the three sets of supporting
routines are as follows:
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• Decision control routines — these refer to the implicit planning and resource
allocation processes regarding the decision that occur in the mind of the de-
cision maker.
• Decision communication routines — these routines involve the the exploration
of the decision situation, focused investigation of the decision scenario for
more specific information, and dissemination regarding decision progress to
interested parties.
• Political routines — these activities relate to the use of power by those affected
by the decision in order to influence the process with the goal of satisfying their
own needs.
The premise of this model of the decision process as per Mintzberg et al. (1976) is
the notion that the decision process functions as a fundamentally linear process of
progression through the three main phases. However, this particular model allows for
cyclic processes within and between these phases. Additionally, there are various
branches which allow for the decision to incorporate the various routines in each
phase. This allows for illustration of decision processes that are as simple or as
complex as the routines demonstrate. Indeed, Mintzberg et al. (1976) utilised this
model to fit 25 specific case studies of a particular decision process to one of seven
fixed paths through the model.
2.4.6 Anarchic Perspective
In contrast to the perspective of organisational decision making discussed in the
previous section, the anarchic perspective suggests that organisations that are char-
acterised as organised anarchies make decisions in a chaotic manner arising from a
fortituous blend of opportunities and solutions (Mintzberg et al., 1976). Cohen et al.
(1972) define organised anarchies as having three distinct properties: problematic
or inconsistent preferences, unclear technology or lack of understanding about the
organisation’s own processes, and fluid participation in terms of the level of involve-
ment among stakeholders over time. The authors argue that most organisations
function as organised anarchies in certain contexts. Further, these anarchies pro-
duce choice situations which are inherently ambiguous and contrary to traditional
theories of management, which necessitates the formation of amended theories of
management (Cohen et al., 1972). The objective of this section, therefore, is to elu-
cidate the behavioural model of organisational decision making postulated by Cohen
et al. (1972).
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2.4.6.1 Garbage Can Model
In order to develop an understanding of choice processes within the type of organ-
isation described in the previous section, the garbage can model was synthesised.
This organisational garbage can exists as a mixture of problems, solutions, and par-
ticipants that only occasionally result in actual solutions that lead to the resolution
of specific problems (Pinfield, 1986). In this model, the decision is an outcome
that arises from the interplay between four distinct streams that exist within the
organisation (Cohen et al., 1972). These streams, as described by the authors, are
elucidated below:
• Choices stream — the stream of choices that exist, of which there is assumed
to be a fixed number. Each of the choices within this stream are defined by
their time of origin for a particular decision as well as the group of participants
that are able to participate in the process of making the associated choice.
• Problems stream — much like the choices stream, the problems stream assumes
the existence of a discrete number of problems. Each of these are defined
by their time of origin, the quantity of energy required to make a decision
regarding the choice that the problem under analysis is attached to, as well as
an inventory of choices accessible to the problem.
• Solutions rate of flow — the rate at which solutions are entering the current
system.
• Energy stream from participants — the number of participants within a partic-
ular garbage can is assumed to be fixed in nature. Every participant is defined
by a quantity of energy available for decision making within the organisation
over time.
The decision process occurs as a process of mapping of choices onto decision makers,
and problems onto choices, which are connected in terms of the organisational struc-
ture access structure.
2.5 Conceptualising Rationality
In Section 2.4.1.1, the classical conception of rationality was elucidated within the
context of rational choice theory. Additionally, a basic distinction between the no-
tions of substantive and procedural rationality was expounded upon as per March
(1994). However, according to Pidd (2004), this comparison was initially popularised
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by Simon (1976) in the context of economic theory. Here, Simon (1976) distinguishes
between these two conceptions of rationality in order to argue that procedural ra-
tionality is consistent with actual human behaviour, and is therefore more relevant
and imperative for the modern organisation. This view is supported by a number
of authors such as Mackenzie et al. (2006) and Pidd (2004), who argue that such
a view of rationality is more suitable to underpin the support of wicked problems
than substantive rationality. In light of this view, the objective of this chapter is to
develop more significant operationalisations of these constructs, in order to facilitate
their understanding in the context of decision support and associated DSSs.
2.5.1 Substantive Rationality
Simon (1976) describes the notion of substantive rationality primarily in the context
of economic theory. Here, he contends that economic theory rests on the assumption
of both clear goals as well as substantive rationality. Fundamentally, this substant-
ive rationality refers to the appropriateness of the behaviour given the goal of the
decision maker. This category of rationality refers, therefore, to the substance of
the decision (Laville, 2000). Thus, substantive rationality is most appropriate for
contexts where the ends are known, but the means to these ends are uncertain
(Mackenzie et al., 2006). Typical examples of such contexts include maximisation
problems as well as other problems which are amenable to mathematical methods,
such as differential calculus and linear programming (Simon, 1976).
2.5.2 Procedural Rationality
The field of psychology, according to Simon (1976), is the field that embraces a typ-
ically procedural view of rationality. Contrary to substantive rationality, he argues,
procedural rationality refers to the appropriateness of the process of deliberation
undertaken in a decision. This variant of rationality therefore refers to the processes
of the decision rather than its substance (Laville, 2000). Hence, the appropriateness
of procedural rationality is contingent on the question of the clarity of the ends as
opposed to the question of uncertainty surrounding means as asserted by substant-
ive rationality (Mackenzie et al., 2006). Thus, the cognitive deficiencies elucidated
in the previous sections as well as uncertainty regarding goals in particular classes of
problem necessitate an approach to decision making which is procedurally rational
(Laville, 2000).
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2.6 Chapter Summary
The aim of this chapter was to examine some of the most prominent normative and
behavioural theories of individual and organisational decision making. The notion of
decision making and the association between normative and descriptive theories was
introduced in Sections 2.1 and 2.2 respectively, followed by a brief elucidation of the
history and origins of decision making theory in Section 2.3. Section 2.4 explored
and described a number of milestones of decision theory in modern times, address-
ing concepts such as rational choice theory, bounded rationality prospect theory,
the notion of heuristics and biases, and important themes in organisational decision
processes in Subsections 2.4.1 to 2.4.6 consecutively. From these sections, various
arguments regarding the issues inherent in human and organisational decision mak-
ing were elucidated. Finally, the concepts of substantive and procedural rationality,
which are central to this thesis, were elucidated in terms of rationality as a concept
in Section 2.5.
The chapter that follows will address the specific category of highly unstructured
and messy decision problem known as the wicked problem.




The notion of varying levels of structuredness in decision problems was famously
postulated by Simon (1960) in the form of programmed versus unprogrammed de-
cisions. Gorry & Morton (1989) further refined this conceptualisation in the context
of decision support through their structured-semi-structured-unstructured frame-
work. However, the notion of unstructured problems, varies in its conceptualisation
in the literature.
A number of authors describe unstructured problems as those problems which can,
at least to some extent, be conceptualised. An early work by Mintzberg et al. (1976)
exploring the concept of unstructured decisions formulated these as those decisions
which lack an existing set of procedures that form a solution to the particular prob-
lem. The assumption underlying the aforementioned study, made explicit by the
authors, is the notion that all decision processes can have order imposed on them
in order to produce the structure necessary to implement a solution. Unstructured
decision problems, according to these authors, are merely decisions whose lack of
structure can be ascribed to their novelty rather than an intrinsic essence.
Conversely, a selection of authors argue for a differing conceptualisation of struc-
turedness. Gorry & Morton (1989) relate the notion of structuredness of a problem
to the extent of reliance on judgement on the part of the decision maker as op-
posed to dependence on the computer for support. Further, these authors associate
structuredness with the level of structure apparent in all three decision making pro-
cesses undertaken for that particular problem. Therefore, they argue, unstructured
problems are unstructured in terms of all of the phases—intelligence, design, and
choice—that make up the decision process. Similarly, Sprague (1980) alludes to less
39
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structured problems as being those problems which can be described as hard, or
which lack specification.
The concept of wicked problems originated in an article by Rittel & Webber (1973)
to refer to highly unstructured, complex societal problems which cannot be resolved
using traditional processes or techniques (Camillus, 2008). The term was origin-
ally applied to the notion of social and policy planning, juxtaposed with the notion
of tame problems which natural scientific inquiry endeavours to solve (Rittel &
Webber, 1973). Examples of wicked problems from the literature include water re-
source management (Freeman, 2000), health inequalities (Blackman et al., 2006),
global obesity (Swinburn et al., 2011), genetically modified food regulation (Durant
& Legge, 2006), recreation management (Brooks & Champ, 2006), IT policy (Kor-
acKakabadse et al., 2000), environmental health promotion (Kreuter et al., 2004),
fisheries and coastal governance (Jentoft & Chuenpagdee, 2009), climate change
(Lazarus, 2009), stakeholder networks (O’Toole, 1997), city planning (Skaburskis,
2008), system design (Buchanan, 1992), public planning (Rittel & Webber, 1973),
and corporate strategy (Camillus, 2008). These decision problems are embedded
in rich social, organisational and political contexts (Ritchey, 2011), and do not ne-
cessarily have a finite solution. Further, they pose a number of challenges for the
development of DSSs for organisations that face these highly complex problems.
Consequently, the objective of this chapter is to describe the nature of these wicked
problems as outlined in the literature, as well as to determine a number of practices
and principles relevant to their resolution.
3.2 The Nature of Wicked Problems
The process of traditional scientific inquiry endeavours to solve problems which can
be defined, and which usually have some definitive solution. Rittel & Webber (1973)
refer to these as tame problems; problems that have a predefined goal and whose
progress and eventual achievement can be evaluated. Wicked problems, are the an-
tithesis of such problems, as they lack such palpability. According to Churchman
(1967, p. B141), Rittel asserted in one of his first seminars on the topic that wicked
problems may be classified as “[the] class of social system problems which are ill-
formulated, where the information is confusing, where there are many clients and
decision makers with conflicting values, and where the ramifications in the whole
system are thoroughly confusing.” These problems are difficult or even impossible to
conceptualise, and rely on human judgement for resolution (Rittel & Webber, 1973).
Implicit in this description is the notion that such problems are never fully solved,
but are resolved continuously and repeatedly as the context demands. Indeed, the
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wicked descriptor expresses what Churchman (1967) describes as the fundamentally
mischievous quality of these types of problems. In order to gain a further under-
standing of the nature of these problems, an elucidation of the concept of wicked
problems will be outlined in the section that follows.
Despite the inherent difficulty in defining the essence of wicked problems, there does
seem to be consensus in the literature regarding traits or features which may act
as indicators that a particular problem is indeed wicked in nature, or has wicked
elements (Camillus, 2008). Rittel & Webber (1973) synthesised a list of ten char-
acteristics of wicked problems in an attempt to provide a level of exposition as to
the types of problems which may be defined as wicked. As Camillus (2008) asserts,
these are not intended as a checklist or a set of absolute criteria, but rather as insight
which may aid the decision maker in judging whether their particular problem has
some degree of wickedness associated with it. These characteristics are summarised
and compared with the notion of regular or tame problems as per Rittel & Webber
(1973) in Table 3.1, and will be expounded further below.
Rittel & Webber (1973) state that wicked problems do not have a fixed or definitive
problem statement. This means that their very substance is unstable and subject
to fluctuation, as the rich social, political and organisational context in which they
are embedded shifts in time and space (Ritchey, 2011). Additionally, the problem
tends to involve a number of stakeholders with divergent goals, values and prefer-
ences (Camillus, 2008). Therefore, the complexity of the problem is compounded by
differing perceptions of its nature in relation to decision makers and other entities
involved. This contrasts strongly with scientific or engineering type problems, in
which the aims of a specific endeavour are usually clearly stated or self-evident.
In addition to the ill-defined nature of wicked problems, the authors assert, there
are a number of issues in selecting, implementing and evaluating solutions to these
problems. The first issue relates to the difficulty in determining whether a solution
has been found. In the context of a regular, tame decision, it is usually clear when a
suitable solution has been discovered. However, in the case of a wicked problem, the
search is usually terminated when a “good enough” solution has been found, rather
than an optimal solution. Therefore, there may always be a “better”, unknown
solution that exists. Further, the actual implemented resolution cannot be evaluated
in terms of objective criteria that allow appraisal of a proposed solution as correct
or incorrect (Rittel & Webber, 1973). Rather, stakeholders involved in the problem
are more likely to subjectively describe the solution in terms of good-bad or better-
worse constructs. Additionally, the implemented solution can never be evaluated
either completely or ultimately (Camillus, 2008). The waves of consequences that
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Table 3.1: Ten characteristics of wicked problems versus regular problems as per
Rittel & Webber (1973)
Tame Problems Wicked Problems
Tame problems have a definite nature
that can be sensibly formulated.
Wicked problems cannot be definitively
formulated; their very essence is in flux
(Skaburskis, 2008).
It is clear when a suitable solution for a
tame problem has been found.
There are no stopping rules for wicked
problems; the termination point of solu-
tion search is unclear.
There potentially exists a correct solu-
tion for a given tame problem.
Solutions to wicked problems are not
correct or incorrect, but good or bad.
The outcome of an implemented solu-
tion can be evaluated immediately and
fairly accurately.
The outcome of an implemented solu-
tion cannot be evaluated immediately or
ultimately.
Multiple attempts at a solution may be
implemented without significant cost.
Solutions are one-shot operations; there
is no opportunity to learn via trial and
error.
Most tame problems, to some extent,
are governed by a finite set of rules.
Potential solutions as well as possible
courses of actions do not exist as defin-
itive sets.
There exist rules for classifying collec-
tions of tame problems.
Wicked problems are unique; experi-
ence isn’t necessarily relevant (Camillus,
2008).
A tame problem can potentially have
a natural level at which it can be ad-
dressed.
Every wicked problem may be viewed
as symptomatic of another, greater
problem.
The root of a tame problem exists ob-
jectively, and plausible explanations can
be refuted to arrive at the most likely
hypothesis.
The root of a wicked problem may be
explained in a number of equally accept-
able ways.
Solutions to these problems are only hy-
potheses offered in order for be refuted
(Popper, 2002).
The decision maker has no intrinsic
right to be absolved of the consequences
of an implemented solution.
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are generated from such solutions extend over an almost infinite period of time,
and may also extend in different directions, rendering any attempt to trace their
effect fruitless. Consequently, it is virtually impossible to fully appreciate the effect
of a particular solution, and as a result, to evaluate its effectiveness. Further, any
solution applied to a wicked problem is a one-shot operation (Rittel & Webber,
1973, p. 163), in that such a solution does not provide an opportunity to learn
from such an application; every attempt has a long-term and irreversible effect
on the problem itself. These consequences themselves can alter the already ill-
defined problem situation, and even create further sets of wicked problems which
are subject to similar challenges (Camillus, 2008). Finally, the authors assert, both
potential solutions and possible courses of action are not limited to a comprehensive,
predefined set. Accordingly, it is impossible to deduce whether all potential solutions
for a particular wicked problem have been included in the solution set, or whether a
solution indeed exists at all. The judgement of the decision maker is an imperative
feature in ending the expansion of the solution space in order to implement a selected
solution.
A further characteristic of wicked problems that Rittel & Webber (1973) describe
is the assertion that every wicked problem has a unique nature. They state that
ordinary problems can often be compared to each other by virtue of their common
traits. However, this is not the case for wicked problems, as there exists no sensible
method of classifying wicked problems in terms of the categories of solution which
may be applied to all members of such a class. As a result, each wicked problem
must be treated as a distinct entity with its own defining characteristics and potential
solutions; there is no advantage to be had from experience with a seemingly related
problem.
Once a solution has been sought, selected and applied to the problem under scrutiny,
it may be the case that the problem was merely a symptom of a greater wicked
problem (Rittel & Webber, 1973). Thus, despite the removal of the alleged cause
of a problem, a problem at a higher level may emerge. Therefore, wicked problems
cannot be solved immediately at all levels. Rather, the level at which the problem
is solved is dependent on the will of the decision maker.
In addition to the cause of a wicked problem being an issue of symptom, the very
choice of explanation of a wicked problem’s causes, along with corresponding solu-
tions, is highly diverse in nature (Rittel & Webber, 1973). There exist no objective or
logical processes for selecting the most plausible explanation; therefore, the explan-
ation selected by a particular decision maker is due to appraisal of that explanation
as having the greatest explanatory power. Such a persuasiveness is partially determ-
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ined by the intrinsic characteristics, world view and goals of the decision maker.
The final characteristic of wicked problems as outlined by Rittel & Webber (1973)
pertains to the liability of decision makers for the consequences of the solutions that
are selected and implemented. The authors strongly contrast this nuance with that
of scientific problems, where refutation of a postulated hypothesis is forgiven, even
encouraged in the process of scientific inquiry. Conversely, the objective of solving
a wicked problem is to attempt to improve aspect of the world which is relevant to
the problem situation. Consequently, decision makers are ultimately responsible for
the repercussions of their decisions (Ritchey, 2013).
3.3 Resolving Wicked Problems
The nature of wicked problems dictates that an alternative approach is necessary for
their resolution than that of tame problems (Mackenzie et al., 2006). As outlined in
the previous section, typical problems with defined problem statements tend to also
have predefined solution sets. Wicked problems, however, are inherently challenging
to resolve due to the absence of linearity present in the progression from problem
definition to solution. Consequently, consensus on their resolution is not ubiquitous
in the literature. Rather, there exist both descriptive and prescriptive elucidations
of a diverse array of strategies and principles that individuals and organisations
might employ in order to address the wicked aspects of problems.
3.3.1 Positive Approaches
According to Conklin (2001), there are two general methods that organisations usu-
ally employ to cope with wicked problems: studying and taming.
Studying the wicked problem is often a necessary strategy at some stage of the
problem resolution process. Analysing the problem and gathering data regarding
its context is imperative in gaining insight into an unfamiliar and complex problem.
However, the author states, the time pressure on such an endeavour is extensive
due to the shifting nature of wicked problems. Additionally, the inaction fostered
by this process can cultivate further inertia, exacerbating the problem considerably.
Wicked problems necessitate a cycle of preliminary action in terms of experiments
and testing in addition to responsive information-gathering (Conklin, 2001).
Attempting to tame the problem is another typical organisational strategy for man-
aging wicked problems that Conklin (2001) describes. This approach entails the
endeavour to reduce the wickedness of the problem in order to make the problem
more manageable, or ideally, even solvable. Each characteristic of the problem that
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Figure 3.1: Path of strategies to cope with wicked problems as per Roberts (2000)
is wicked in nature is transformed into the tame version of that characteristic. How-
ever, these approaches only work in the short term, and either cause the problem
to reappear in a different form or to be aggravated and intensified. These two
strategies act as coping mechanisms for those faced with wicked problems, the se-
lection of which corresponds to the natural preferences of the stakeholders directly
involved with the problem. As expressed in each case, neither of these strategies is
ultimately effective in managing or resolving wicked problems.
Roberts (2000) developed a model based on conflict and power dynamics within
organisations to arrive at three potential strategies that stakeholders may use to
manage wicked problems. The model involves the selection of a strategy based on
the level of conflict and power dynamics within the problem context. Figure 3.1
demonstrates this path selection.
The first question pertains to the level of conflict present in the problem. Low
levels of conflict, or conflict related only to the problem solution are consistent
with non-wicked problem situations. Wicked problem situations involve conflict
over the problem definition as well as potential solutions. If power is concentrated
and not dispersed among stakeholders, then an authoritative strategy is suitable
to determine the nature of the problem along with prospective solutions. If power
is dispersed among stakeholders but is also contested, then a competitive strategy
may be employed. If power is both dispersed and not contested, then a collaborative
strategy is more appropriate. Each of these strategy types are outlined in Table 3.2.

























Table 3.2: Strategies to combat wicked problems as per Roberts (2000)
Strategy Description Advantages Disadvantages
Authoritative There is an attempt to tame the problem by limiting
stakeholder involvement to a small group.
Those selected as participants on this group may
have greater expertise in the context of the problem
situation.
e.g. The Supreme Court makes decisions regarding
the outcome of trials.
Fewer stakeholders may equate to minimised com-
plexity. Consequently, the process of seeking out and
reaching consensus on a solution may be achieved
more quickly and with less conflict taking place.
Reliance on a small group of stakeholders that
have expert knowledge of the problem may increase
the objectivity of and speed with which solutions are
selected and implemented.
Experts are not always correct about the problem or
the solution to that problem.
Confining a problem to a group of homogen-
eous stakeholders can narrow the scope of solution
search, with the risk of experts ignoring information
or alternative views of the problem that do not fit
into their frame.
Stakeholders excluded from the process lose out
on the opportunity to learn, engage with the
problem, and potentially become experts themselves.
Competitive Stakeholders are involved in a “zero-sum game”. The
right to define the problem situation and select a solution
becomes an award granted to the “winners” in the power
game. The “losers” gain no such privilege.
The pursuit for power becomes the fundamental task of
competitive strategies. Once power has been attained,
the “winning” stakeholder(s) may resort to authoritative
strategies to tame the problem in the context of their
frame.
e.g. Countries at war over land.
Competition drives the search for novel information
and accelerates innovation.
It is also a driver of action versus inertia; with
the threat of power being taken, stakeholders are
motivated to make decisions and take strong stances
on important issues.
Competition can challenge the status quo of in-
stitutionalised and concentrated power, as truly
competitive strategies generate constant threat of
impending power shifts.
Intense competition can ultimately lead to disorder
and violence between stakeholders.
Resources that could be better utilised in solv-
ing the problem are squandered during the conflict.
The stand-offs caused by stakeholders blocking
each others’ efforts can prevent the progress towards
resolution of the problem.
Collaborative Based on a “win-win” view of problem solving; teaming
up to face the problem together will yield a more favour-
able outcome than any one stakeholder on their own.
All parties involved in the decision gain a share of
the profits.
e.g. Military alliances between governments in or-
der to achieve a common goal.
Costs and benefits are shared among stakeholders.
Strength in numbers; burdens are shared.
More profitable outcomes can be gained by parties
seeking a common end.
Greater efficiency can be achieved due to reduc-
tion of redundancies and appropriate concentration
of plentiful resources.
The increased number of involved stakeholders raises
transaction costs as well as the difficulty in reaching
agreement.
Collaboration requires practice, which costs ad-
ditional resources.
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Blackman et al. (2006) × ×
Brooks & Champ (2006) ×
Calton & Payne (2003) × ×
Camillus (2008) × × ×
Churchman (1967) ×
Conklin (2001) × × × × ×
Freeman (2000) ×
Jentoft & Chuenpagdee (2009) × × × ×
Karacapilidis & Papadias (2001) × ×
Kreuter et al. (2004) × × × ×
Kunz & Rittel (1970) × ×
Mackenzie et al. (2006) × ×
Munneke et al. (2007) × ×
Ritchey (2013) × ×
Rittel & Webber (1973) × ×
Roberts (2000) × × × ×
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3.3.2 Normative Approaches and Principles
Roberts (2000) proposes that collaborative strategies are superior alternatives for the
management and resolution of wicked problems, with cognisance of the fact that this
flavour of strategy is intrinsically more challenging to implement. However, despite
the alleged advantage, collaboration is a strategy that is often not selected initially,
but rather only following the failure of one or more of the other two strategies. At
this stage, stakeholders are more willing to attempt an alternative approach and
forego the higher costs associated with such a strategy.
Within the literature, a number of suggestions regarding management of wicked
problems are made by a various authors in a number of diverse wicked problem
contexts. These are summarised in Table 3.3.
3.3.2.1 Recognising Wickedness
Rittel & Webber (1973) state that in order to address a wicked problem in any
capacity, it is imperative to acknowledge the presence of wickedness inherent in the
aforementioned problem. Problems need not be classified in terms of wickedness in
a binary fashion (Conklin, 2001), but rather fall along a continuum in accordance
with the degree of wickedness which is present (Kreuter et al., 2004). It is this
wickedness which should be perceived and interpreted within the problem context.
Failure to acknowledge the endemic issues of these types of problems may ultimately
lead to the erroneous utilisation of unsuitable methods and tools in order to address
the problem (Conklin, 2001).
3.3.2.2 Abstaining from Taming the Problem
Roberts (2000) asserts that efforts to tame a wicked problem are unlikely to be
effective, as the problem will either reassert itself, or exacerbate the wickedness
present in a particular problem situation. Generally, attempts to tame a wicked
problem involve the manipulation of one or more of its wicked features in order
to generate the appearance of the problem being tame in nature (Conklin, 2001).
In addition to such behaviour having a pragmatically profound impact, a number
of authors, such as Rittel & Webber (1973) as well as Churchman (1967) have
asserted that claiming to have tamed a wicked problem is deceitful in the morally
reprehensible sense, as it is misleading to other individuals who are affected by the
problem.
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3.3.2.3 Defining and Measuring Progress
Despite the futility inherent in attempting to objectively define the constitution
of “success” in a wicked problem situation and associated quantitative markers of
progress (Conklin, 2001), there should exist some flexible, self-regulating, and collab-
orate process that tends towards resolution (Roberts, 2000). This should entail the
monitoring of the problem and its proximity to collaboratively defined benchmarks
(Kreuter et al., 2004).
3.3.2.4 Involving Stakeholders and Facilitating Communication
A fairly sizeable portion of the literature suggests that the involvement of a diverse
assortment of problem stakeholders should be facilitated in order to foster dialogue
and communication among these parties. Collaboration regarding definition of the
problem statement, as well as possible actions to be taken, increases the likelihood
of support and commitment from these stakeholders, and increases diversity of per-
spectives (Brooks & Champ, 2006) and greater utilisation of tacit knowledge (Cam-
illus, 2008). Exchange of information occurs between participants, experts, systems
and decision makers (Kunz & Rittel, 1970), enabling a collective understanding of
the problem situation (Kreuter et al., 2004) and facilitating understanding of the so-
cial context (Brooks & Champ, 2006). Ultimately, the collaborative process should
lead to the emergence of common objectives, language and vision for the group
of stakeholders (Brooks & Champ, 2006), and fundamentally assist stakeholders in
establishing a common identity for the organisation (Camillus, 2008). This iden-
tity, in turn, provides direction and focuses attention on opportunities and threats
(Camillus, 2008). Further, creating a mutual understanding of the wicked problem
through respectful and transparent dialogue (Jentoft & Chuenpagdee, 2009; Kreuter
et al., 2004) fosters stakeholder commitment towards taking action to resolve the
problem (Camillus, 2008; Brooks & Champ, 2006). Perhaps ironic, however, is the
inevitable wickedness inherent in the very process of collaboration itself (Jentoft &
Chuenpagdee, 2009); complexity is greatly increased in relation to the number of
stakeholders involved (Roberts, 2000).
3.3.2.5 Facilitating debate and argumentation
Perceptions regarding the objectives of facilitating the discussion of diverse and
contrasting views vary among the authors of the literature reviewed. A subset
of authors contend that the contribution of this process lies in the negotiation of
the problem statement, possible solutions, and goals, with the aim of reaching what
Ritchey (2013) describes as first-order consensus, or agreement regarding these issues
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(Karacapilidis & Papadias, 2001). However, a number of authors oppose this view,
arguing that the objective should not be to arrive at a consensus, but rather for
stakeholders to comprehend and acknowledge each others’ positions and reasoning
behind these positions (Mackenzie et al., 2006), reaching second-order consensus
(Ritchey, 2013). The process can also be supported by capturing and documenting
these opinions, issues, and ideas (Camillus, 2008; Kunz & Rittel, 1970), plausibly
leading to a more thorough understanding of the problem situation, alternatives,
and outcomes associated with each of these alternatives (Ritchey, 2013).
3.3.2.6 Implementing Opportunity-Driven Problem Solving
Conklin (2001) asserts that the continuous process of studying a wicked problem can
be counter-productive to the resolution of said problem, as it can lead to paralysis
and inaction among decision makers. Camillus (2008) proposes that taking action,
even solely at a pilot or prototypical level, is a more effective strategy than relentless
study. This opportunity-driven behaviour assists in promoting a creative thinking
process and increased learning about the problem domain (Conklin, 2001). This
is partly due to the proposition that natural human problem solving is not linear
in nature, but involves oscillation between studying, or furthering understanding of
the problem situation, and attempts at resolution (Conklin, 2001).
3.4 Chapter Summary
The objective of this chapter was to explore the notion of wicked problems in vari-
ous contexts. Section 3.1 provided an introduction to and contextualisation of the
concept, followed by Section 3.2, which described and elucidated their nature. It was
found that the concept of wicked problems itself is rather elusive, though there do
exist a number of characteristics which may designate the level of wickedness present
in a particular problem. Wickedness is therefore not a discrete category, but may be
present at a minor or major level within any given problem. Strategies for coping
with these levels of wickedness were elucidated in Section 3.3, both in descriptive
terms as well as prescriptive terms. Subsection 3.3.2 specifically derived a list of
principles for coping with wicked problems as extrapolated from the literature.
The chapter that follows will address prominent themes in the literature related to
DSSs.




According to Arnott & Pervan (2008), initial DSS development originated in the
1970s as a response to highly complex and massive planning problems (Power, 2002).
Initially, the aim of these systems was to address perceived deficiencies inherent in
human decision making (Shim et al., 2002; Simon, 1955). In more recent literature,
DSSs are asserted to have the goal of improving the decision process itself, as well
as impacting the outcome of such a decision (Arnott & Pervan, 2005; Arnott, 2006;
Keen & Morton, 1978). In this way, the purpose of a DSS may involve improving any
combination of both of the procedural as well as the substantive varieties of human
rationality discussed in Chapter 2. Sections 4.2 and 4.3 address the conceptual
definition and historical development of DSSs respectively.
Along with the evolution of computing technology, the varying levels of focus of the
DSS has resulted in DSSs increasing in both variety and complexity. Section 4.4
explores a number of prominent frameworks and taxonomies of DSSs presented in
the literature. Finally, Section 4.5 summarises the primary findings of the chapter.
4.2 Definition
In early literature, there exist a number of apparent identity crises experienced by
DSS research during its emergence during the 1980s (Pearson & Shim, 1995). Firstly,
there existed the presupposition that the DSS as a concept was either partially
or fully encapsulated in the demarcation of MIS research, and not necessarily an
entity in its own right (Sprague, 1980). Alternatively, the view of DSSs as a radical
reaction to MISs also existed (Arnott, 2006). Second, there existed some uncertainty
regarding the scope of DSSs in the overall decision making process (Sprague, 1980),
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with the frequent side-effect being the assumption that any application which in
some sense addresses decision making in any context is in fact a DSS (Hayen, 2006).
Third, the ever-changing nature of IT in IS necessarily implies the dynamic, ever-
changing nature of DSS applications (Hayen, 2006). Consequently, the term DSS
has become inherently difficult to reach consensus on, both in theory and in practice.
Therefore, it seems prudent to develop a working definition in this thesis, for the
sake of both consistency and clarity.
For the purposes of this thesis, a DSS is defined as some computer or IT-based
(Arnott & Pervan, 2008; Hayen, 2006; Keen & Morton, 1978; Power, 2001; Shim
et al., 2002) information system (Arnott & Pervan, 2005; Arnott, 2006; Arnott &
Pervan, 2008; Power, 2001) that fulfils the purposes of supporting one or more stages
of the semistructured or unstructured decision making process (Keen & Morton,
1978; Power, 2001; Sprague, 1980) rather than replacing decision maker judgement
(Hayen, 2006). The primary aim of this endeavour is to increase the effectiveness
of this process rather than operational efficiency, though efficiency may exist as
a secondary goal (Arnott & Pervan, 2005; Arnott, 2006; Arnott & Pervan, 2008;
Hayen, 2006; Keen & Morton, 1978; Pearson & Shim, 1995).
A variety of further refinements are made to parts or the whole of this definition
in terms of the alleged structure and functionality of DSSs. This has led to the
development of a number of frameworks and taxonomies by an assortment of authors;
these are explored in Section 4.4. The following section will highlight important
elements of the history and evolution of DSSs in theory and in practice described in
the literature.
4.3 Historical Overview and DSS Types
4.3.1 DSS Origins
According to Shim et al. (2002), the field of DSSs has predominantly evolved from
two disparate research areas: theoretical decision making conducted during the
1950s and early 1960s, and technical activities and exploration conducted during
the 1960s. It was during this period of technical study that the term decision
support systems was first used; allegedly in a paper authored by Gorry and Scott
Morton in 1971 (Gorry & Morton, 1989), despite prior research related to decision
support undertaken in the previous decade (Arnott & Pervan, 2005). In this paper,
the authors developed a framework for DSSs through the combination of Anthony’s
managerial activity categories Anthony (1965) and Simon’s decision type taxonomy
(Simon, 1973). This led to the conceptual synthesis of a DSS as a computer system
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that supported managerial decisions that were unstructured or semi-structured in
nature (Arnott & Pervan, 2005; Courtney, 2001; Shim et al., 2002). Implicit in this
definition was also the notion that the objective of DSSs was to support the more
structured portion of the decision, leaving the important task of judgement to the
human decision maker. The result was an integrated man-machine decision system
(Arnott & Pervan, 2005; Shim et al., 2002; Te’eni & Ginzberg, 1991). Further, the
task of the DSS was further characterised by Gorry & Morton (1989) through Si-
mon’s conception of the decision process phases (Simon, 1960): intelligence, design,
and choice (Courtney, 2001; Shim et al., 2002).
Much of the history which follows this early period is inextricably linked to various
types or classes of DSSs, due to the aforementioned effects of IT developments on
the field over time. These historical developments will therefore be discussed in this
context in the sections that follow, though the reader should note that there will
be considerable overlap with the framework and taxonomy section that follows as
a result. However, it is imperative to appreciate, as Power (2008) notes, the fact
that the history of the field is essentially non-linear in nature, and that the various
points of evolution within the field will differ based on the vantage point occupied.
Therefore, in some sense, the framework or classification used may inform one’s
perception of the development of the field. The two conceptions of DSS history
that will be delineated are those of Arnott & Pervan (2005) and the subsequently
revised Arnott & Pervan (2014), and Power (2008), each of which are demonstrated
in Figures 4.1 and 4.2 respectively.
4.3.2 An Account of DSS History by Arnott & Pervan (2005)
Arnott & Pervan (2005) delineate a history of DSSs that stems from a somewhat
radical reaction to MIS, and evolves towards a structure of interconnected DSSs
approaches and types. An exposition of each are presented in the sections that
follow.
4.3.2.1 Personal Decision Support Systems (PDSSs)
According to the authors, PDSSs emerged as a reaction of sorts to the exception-
ally large, corporation-focused systems at the time, known as MISs in the 1970s.
PDSSs endeavoured to empower individual managers by supporting particular de-
cision tasks. The evolution of such systems was largely enabled by the development
of the microcomputer and corresponding advancements in application development.
The resulting applications were far more user-friendly than MISs and therefore ad-
opted more successfully to the extent that they are still largely prevalent in man-
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za

















































Figure 4.1: Evolution of DSSs as per Arnott & Pervan (2005)
agement. Arnott & Pervan (2005) further asserts that PDSSs can be further clas-
sified into two additional categories as elucidated by Alter (1977): data-oriented
and model-oriented DSSs. In modern DSSs, these two orientations are merged to
form powerful DSSs that are largely model-driven, with the additional advantage of
having access to immense datasets. These modern DSSs are currently referred to as
analytics in industry.
4.3.2.2 Group Support Systems (GSSs)
A GSS differs from PDSSs primarily in the sense that the responsibility for the
supported decision is shared by a number of managers (Arnott & Pervan, 2005).
A GSS therefore consists of various software, hardware, and procedures that are
amalgamated to supported a group of individuals involved in a meeting regarding a
particular decision or group of decisions. Generally, GSSs can be developed as one
of two types: electronic meeting systems (EMSs) or group decision systems (GDSs).
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Implicit in the outcome of decisions taken using such systems are the attributes of the
group itself, nature of the task at hand, the context of the group and organisation,
as well as the system itself. These types of systems, according to Arnott & Pervan
(2005), emerged during the late 1970s and early 1980s.
4.3.2.3 Negotiation Support Systems (NSSs)
NSSs refers to a type of DSS that is implemented to facilitate negotiation in de-
cision contexts requiring such an activity. Therefore, NSSs can, in some sense, be
considered a conceptual branch of GSSs due to the similarity of task orientation.
However, these DSSs are theoretically rooted in fields such as game theory and social
choice theory originating in the early 1940s, and themselves only emerged during
the mid 1980s and early 1990s.
4.3.2.4 Intelligent Decision Support Systems (IDSSs)
According to Arnott & Pervan (2005), IDSSs are the variant of DSSs whose object-
ives frequently exist in tension with the typical objectives of DSSs. The logic of
particular IDSSs that are rooted in AI techniques aim to replace human reasoning,
rather than to augment the decision making process as per classical DSSs. IDSS en-
deavours can be divided into two generations as per Turban et al. (2005): rule-based
expert systems (first generation) and neural networks, genetic algorithms, and fuzzy
logic (second generation). The first generation emerged as early as the 1970s.
4.3.2.5 Executive Information Systems (EISs) and Business
Intelligence (BI)
Fitzgerald (1992) define an EIS as a DSS which is data-oriented in nature, and that
provides reporting capabilities about the state of the organisation to managers of
that organisation. Arnott & Pervan (2005) assert that the notion of EISs origin-
ated in the mid to late 1980s due to enabling technologies which emerged at the
time. Data cubes1 and dashboard interfaces2 provide insight into the health of the
organisation through the visualisation of critical success factors (Rockart, 1978).
4.3.2.6 Data Warehouses
The rise of EISs along with the nature of the corporation in the 1990s necessitated
the availability of enormous quantities of data for managers that was also of high
1Data cubes are hierarchical layers of reports that allow managers or other stakeholders access
to a multi-dimensional view of the data and associated variances (Arnott & Pervan, 2005).
2Dashboard interfaces refer to a web-based style of presenting reports to the user that revolu-
tionised the look and feel of EISs (Arnott & Pervan, 2005).
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Figure 4.2: Evolution of DSSs as per Power (2008)
quality (Arnott & Pervan, 2005). Data warehouses emerged as the technology to
provide such data for decision making by means of a set of databases organised in
an efficient and useful manner through dimensional modelling3.
4.3.2.7 Knowledge Management-Based Decision Support Systems
KM-based DSSs rose to prominence in the 1990s due to the focus on organisational
KM which was salient at the time (Arnott & Pervan, 2005). These types of DSS focus
on supporting KM activities throughout the organisation, such as knowledge stor-
age, retrieval, transfer, and application (Arnott & Pervan, 2008). This is achieved
through supporting of both individual as well as organisational memory and access
to knowledge across groups.
4.3.3 An Account of DSS History by Power (2008)
Power (2008) sketches the pragmatic history of DSSs in terms of five broad DSS
application types, each of which were enabled by technological and theoretical devel-
opments at the time. The author asserts that the purpose of utilising this expanded
3Dimensional modelling refers to a means of organising data within a data warehouse that
places the unit of analysis at the centre of focus along various dimensions represented as linked
tables (Garcia-Molina et al., 2009).
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framework is to “retrospectively discuss the historical evolution of [DSSs]” (Power,
2008, p. 132). An elucidation of each of these follows below.
4.3.3.1 Model-Driven DSSs
According to Power (2008), the earliest DSSs of the late 1960s and early 1970s were
primarily model-driven in nature. This DSS variant refers to those systems that are
concerned with the leveraging and utilisation of stored model definitions to perform
optimisation or simulation activities. This class of DSS has led to the development
of specialised applications such as spreadsheet software and spatially-oriented DSSs.
4.3.3.2 Data-Driven DSSs
The author, similarly to Arnott & Pervan (2005), describes a class of DSS which
is heavily reliant on enormous quantities of data related to the organisation at dif-
ferent points in time. These systems, which Power (2008) refers to as data-driven
DSSs, consist of systems such as EIS and BI systems underpinned by extensive data
warehousing and OLAP technologies. This variant of DSS emerged during the mid
1970s, with advances in database technology such as OLAP in the 1990s fuelling
further adoption of such decision support in large corporations such as Wal-Mart.
4.3.3.3 Communications-Driven DSSs
Communications-driven DSSs are those DSSs which make use of various tools and
technologies to facilitate the process of communication and collaboration related
to decision making activities. Early examples in the 1970s included computerised
conferencing, while the 1980s brought the advent of GDSSs and CDSSs to encourage
negotiation and problem-solving in teams.
4.3.3.4 Document-Driven DSSs
Power (2008) presents document-driven DSSs as tools that utilise computer-based
storage and retrieval techniques to support the process of document retrieval and
analysis. These systems originated in the 1970s in the form of document manage-
ment, or text-oriented DSSs. A search engine is a modern variant of document-driven
DSSs, where extensive collections of hyperlinked documents are indexed and made
available.
4.3.3.5 Knowledge-Driven DSSs
Knowledge-driven DSSs perform a somewhat different function from typical DSSs in
that the goal is to provide suggestions for further action on the part of the decision
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maker (Power, 2008). These DSSs contain domain-specific expertise and various
approaches to solving problems within that domain. Expert systems are an early
example of such DSSs that emerged during the mid 1960s with rule-based expert
systems, along with AI technologies augmenting these abilities in fields such as fraud
detection, medical diagnostics, and scheduling.
4.3.3.6 The Impact of WWW / Internet Technologies
When discussing each of the five DSS application types, Power (2008) makes ref-
erence to the impact of the WWW / Internet on each DSS application other than
model-driven DSSs explicitly. In each case, the protocols of the Internet, along with
the display and structuring properties of web-based systems are raised as enabling
factors for these DSS types. Further, in Bhargava & Power (2001), the authors
make the statement that WWW technologies have greatly transformed the manner
in which all DSSs are designed, developed, and implemented.
4.4 Frameworks and Taxonomies
A key theme in DSSs literature is that of classifying DSSs with regards to some
defined criterion. According to Hayen (2006), the frameworks that arise as a result
of this process aid in exploring relationships within and between DSSs, thereby
enabling acquisition of perspective in the field of DSSs. Further, these frameworks
provide focus for the field and increase effectiveness of efforts in IS (Gorry & Morton,
1989). A number of frameworks outlined in the literature will be elucidated in the
sections that follow.
4.4.1 Framework of Gorry & Morton (1989)
This framework, originally published in 1971, applies a decision making frame to the
concept of the MIS, which was exceptionally prevalent in organisations at the time.
It also explores the types of decisions that are made in an organisation, and attempts
to postulate the nature of information and corresponding information system that
would best suit each type of decision respectively. These dimensions are illustrated
in Figure 4.3.
This framework is synthesised by juxtaposing the classifications of managerial activ-
ity postulated by Anthony (1965) and an extension of the classification of the struc-
turedness of decision problems outlined by Simon (1960). The author defines struc-
tured decisions as those decisions in which the three phases of the decision process
as outlined by Simon (1960) - intelligence, design, and choice - are structured. Un-
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Figure 4.3: Framework for IS as per Gorry & Morton (1989)
structured decisions comprise no structured phases, while semi-structured decisions
possess at least one structured phase. The authors of this framework argue that it
demonstrates an intrinsic truth about the level of problem and its relation to MIS
at the time: “To the extent that a given problem is semi-structured or unstruc-
tured, there is an absence of a routine procedure for dealing with it.” (Gorry &
Morton, 1989, p. 54). Consequently, MISs address structured problems with great
effectiveness, while unstructured problems are primarily the domain of management.
4.4.2 Taxonomy of Alter (1977)
Alter (1977) describes a taxonomy that categorises DSSs in accordance with the
level of influence that the system has on the final decision, as well as the generic
operations that the system performs (Power, 2002). Each of these DSS types are
presented, along with descriptions and examples of each respectively, in Table 4.1.
In order to develop this taxonomy, the authors compiled small case studies for each
of 56 individual DSSs. The eventual classification methodology groups the various
DSSs in terms of the level of decision support each provides, from the most basic
retrieval and presentation of information, consequences of various actions, to actual
decision making activities. The various items in the taxonomy are presented in order
of increasing responsibility of the DSS in the decision task.
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Table 4.1: Alter’s taxonomy of DSSs as per Alter (1977)
DSS Type Elucidation Examples
File drawer systems Essentially automated ver-
sions of manual filing systems
that provide access to partic-
ular items.
OLTP
Data analysis systems Allow computerised analysis





ation through access to a
series of decision-oriented




Utilise built-in formulas to de-







of conceivable actions through






Enable attainment of a spe-
cific objective, i.e., optimal
solution, that is mathematic-
ally complicated to calculate,
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els, but supply a specific sug-
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4.4.3 Framework of Keen (1980)
The framework proposed by Keen (1980), unlike many of the other frameworks in-
vestigated in this section, proposes a DSS design approach. This adaptive design
approach is arguably the most widely cited, and subsequently most influential, de-
scription of the evolutionary approach to DSS design and development (Arnott &
Pervan, 2005). An illustration of this approach is presented in Figure 4.4.
The framework comprises the three major actors that are involved in DSS devel-
opment - the user (U), the builder / designer (B), and the system itself (S). The
framework also includes the influences flowing between these three actors. An ex-
planation of each of the three pairs of resulting links follows:
• System-user link — this link, known as the cognitive loop, demonstrates how
the system influences managerial learning (S → U) while the user leverages
the system’s capabilities (U → S).
• User-builder link — the implementation loop refers to the relationship between
the user and the builder during the design and development process. Here, the
user informs the builder what is required from the system (U → B), thereby
facilitating a middle-out design approach, encouraging user-driven design. The
builder must comprehend the user’s perspective and respond appropriately
(B → U) in order for this middle-out approach to operate effectively.
• System-builder link — the so-called evolution loop demonstrates the actual
evolutionary system design and development process. By virtue of the user
using the system via (U → S), pressure is placed indirectly by the system on
the designer (S → B). The builder then adds the required novel functionality
to the system via (B → S).
4.4.4 Framework of Sprague (1980)
Sprague (1980) takes a characteristics-based approach to defining and delineating
DSSs, with the goal of drawing sufficiently succinct, yet inclusive boundaries around
the construct. From this perspective, DSSs are viewed as consisting of multiple levels
of technology and user roles within the organisation. The nature of these levels and
their relationships are displayed in Figure 4.5.
According to the author, there exist three technology levels:
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Figure 4.4: Framework for adaptive DSS design as per Keen (1980)
• Specific DSS — this refers to the actual DSS system which performs the task
of supporting the decision process of a decision maker or group of decision
makers.
• DSS generator — a DSS generator is a group of hardware and software com-
ponents which enable development of a specific DSS.
• DSS tools — this level refers to hardware and software components which
enable the development of either of the two technological components described
above, that is, a specific DSS or a DSS generator.
These three technology levels interact directly with five user roles in the organisation.
• Manager / user — the individual who is actually responsible for the taking of
a particular decision and its associated consequence(s).
• Intermediary — an individual who assists the user in the decision task, either
at a conceptual or pragmatic level.
• DSS builder — the DSS builder develops the specific DSS for the user by
compiling the appropriate components from the DSS generator.
• Technical supporter — this individual develops further functionality compris-
ing the DSS generator as necessary.
• Toolsmith — the individual who fulfils the role of developing new technologies
and languages, as well as novel hardware and software which may be leveraged
to develop further DSS applications.
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Figure 4.5: Levels of DSSs and and associated user roles as per Sprague (1980)
In addition to technological and organisational characteristics, Sprague (1980) also
describes DSSs in terms of their performance objectives and capabilities. Perhaps
the most notable of these is the technical capabilities of the DSS from the perspect-
ive of the builder. This is delineated in Figure 4.6, and demonstrates the various
components of a DSS in relation to the task and environment. The three major
components are elucidated below:
• Data subsystem — this subsystem consists of the DBMS along with its associ-
ated database. These facilitate combination of a wide variety of data sources,
management of data in terms of capturing, adding, and deleting data, as well
as enabling individual analysis and manipulation of data.
• Model subsystem — the model subsystem allows for the creation of models
through integration with the database, and to enable appropriate storage,
cataloguing and linking of models.
• User system interface — the user system interface manages the interface
between the user and the system. This should be achieved in a manner which
allows for a variety of display styles, user actions, and presentation formats.
4.4.5 Framework of Bonczek et al. (1981)
Bonczek et al. (1981) define a framework for DSSs in terms of the types of specialised
functions each component of the system performs. These are illustrated in Figure
4.7 and outlined as follows:
• Language system (LS) — the language system comprises all of the syntax
that the decision maker is permitted to use within the DSS. The languages
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Figure 4.7: Structure of a DSS as per Bonczek et al. (1981)
allow said decision maker to express themselves, as well as limit the range of
expression that may be articulated.
• Problem processing system (PPS) — this system acts as an interface between
the LS and KS by synthesising information from the symbolic representations
produced by the two systems. The nature of this information is such that it
enables and supports the decision process.
• Knowledge system (KS) — the system that contains the entire compendium of
knowledge that the system possesses in the problem domain. This knowledge
is represented and organised in a systematic manner so as to enable retrieval.
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4.4.6 Framework of Hackathorn & Keen (1981)
The framework postulated by Hackathorn & Keen (1981) extends the early frame-
work presented by Gorry & Morton (1989) in 1971. The authors, adopting a particu-
larly organisational perspective, categorise DSSs in terms of the level of user support
provided by a particular system. The addition of the third axis, task interdepend-
ency, further classifies a given DSS in terms of the level of entanglement between
the actors involved in a decision given a particular decision task. This framework is
presented in Figure 4.8 and elucidated as follows.
According to the authors, the framework of Gorry & Morton (1989) combines a
version of Simon’s notion of task structuredness with Anthony’s managerial activ-
ity classification. However, they argue that this framework does no account for
the interactions between individuals within an organisation. They therefore extend
the framework to include the dimension of task interdependency as presented by
Thomson (2011), which consists of three levels:
• Independent — the task which is independent can be performed without the
actor interacting with other individuals.
• Pooled — this task is defined as those which require two or more people inter-
acting in order for them to all complete their associated tasks.
• Sequential — the sequential task refers to the task where a number of indi-
viduals must complete their associated tasks in a particular sequence, with
outputs from one task acting as inputs for subsequent tasks in the sequence.
In light of this additional dimension, the authors assert that decision support can
take on one or a combination of three levels:
• Personal support — for independent problems that do not require interde-
pendencies, personal support places a focus on a single user, or group of users
involved in a single task.
• Group support — group support focuses on a group of users engaging in dis-
parate, yet interdependent tasks. Pooled interdependency is the variant of
dependency that exists, which requires a system that can be utilised collabor-
atively for planning and analysis.
• Organisational support — the most interdependent of decision support levels,
organisational support focuses on a group of sequential tasks that involve mul-
tiple actors.
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Figure 4.8: DSS framework in terms of task interdependency as per Hackathorn &
Keen (1981)
Hackathorn & Keen (1981) further argue that personal support is still relevant in
the organisational context, but that these should be leveraged appropriately in the
correct situations in order to be effective.
4.4.7 Framework of Mackenzie et al. (2006)
Mackenzie et al. (2006) provide a novel frame for DSS classification in that there
exists a differentiation between two types of DSSs based on the complexity of the
decision or problem situation that the system attempts to support. The authors
assert that conventional, or substantive DSSs focus on support through provision of
knowledge-based expertise, relying primarily on a knowledge base embedded in the
system. Conversely, they argue, a procedural DSS provides processes and tools that
support decision makers in the actual process of decision making by encouraging and
facilitating the search for alternatives, systematic analysis, conflict resolution and
transparency of deliberation to stakeholders. Fundamentally, the procedural DSS
is suitable for the exploration of wicked problems, as decision makers are provided
with a framework that acts as a boundary for such an individual to navigate the
complex decision space (Mackenzie et al., 2006). The emphasis is on support of
the entire life cycle of the decision process, allowing decision makers to capture and
change decision processes and associated information in relation to the instability
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inherent in the associated wicked problems.
4.5 Chapter Summary
The aim of this chapter was to to explore the concept of DSSs in order to present their
common features and origins within the IS field. In Section 4.2, a working definition
of a DSS as an IT-based information system for supporting human decision maker(s)
facing problems of an unstructured nature, was synthesised. This was followed by
a historical overview of the conceptual and practical development of DSSs as a field
in terms of two perspectives in the literature in Section 4.3. This historical outline,
being primarily taxonomic in nature, was extended through an elucidation of a
number of other DSS taxonomies and frameworks for conceptualisation, design, and
development in Section 4.4.
The chapter that follows outlines the actual research process undertaken, and dis-
cusses and details the results of the study.




As highlighted in previous chapters, it has been suggested that wicked or highly un-
structured problems require an approach to decision support that is quite different
from that of semi-structured problems. Additionally, it is asserted that a compre-
hensive literature study concerning the nature of decision support in the context
of wicked problems is lacking in the literature. Further, the rationale behind the
research paradigm and approach was presented in Chapter 1. The aim of this study,
therefore, is to develop a relatively complete overview of the research regarding DSSs
supporting wicked problems. In order to achieve this, one primary and six second-
ary research questions were synthesised in Chapter 1. The aim of this chapter is
to provide a description and exposition of the research design and methods used
to collect data with the goal of answering these research questions. The research
questions are also addressed in terms of the findings from the literature.
5.2 Literature Search and Review Strategy
The search and review strategy for the applied literature review was undertaken in
an iterative fashion. In each cycle, a keyword search revealed a number of different
sources. Each of these studies was scanned for relevance, and retained or discarded
accordingly. Following this, a snowball sampling approach was employed in order
to locate additional related and relevant research. Each of these cycles revealed
additional plausible keyword combinations which were then utilised in another cycle
of keyword searching and snowball sampling. Levy & Ellis (2006) relates the meta-
phorical structure of such search as a concertina, with cycles of gradual narrowing
and subsequent enlargement of the search. This process is illustrated in Figure 5.1.
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Figure 5.1: Metaphorical concertina structure of literature search as per Levy &
Ellis (2006)
Table 5.1: Keywords used in literature search
Search Terms
decision support system AND wicked problem
decision support AND wicked problem
decision support AND unstructured problem
decision support AND ill-structured problem
decision support AND complex problem
5.2.1 Initial Keyword Search
In order to conduct the initial search for literature pertaining specifically to DSSs
for wicked problems, a number of keyword combinations were utilised. These are
listed in Table 5.1. The objective of utilising these pairs of search times joined by
the AND operator was to locate studies that made some mention of DSSs or decision
support, and also considered an element of the given problem situation as wicked,
unstructured, ill-structured, or complex.
These keyword searches were conducted in the EBSCOhost (EBSCO Industries Inc,
2015) and Web of Science (Thomson Reuters, 2015) databases through Stellenbosch
University’s library services. These databases were selected for the primary liter-
ature search due to their wide scope and availability of options for limiting and
refining search results. Additionally, due to the interdisciplinary nature of the IS
field in general, it is imperative to consider journals that exist outside of the field
as well as those that exist explicitly within the field (Webster & Watson, 2002).
Therefore, studies implementing decision support principles in an applied wicked
problem context were also located.
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Keywords were initially applied only to the title and topic of the search fields, and
later applied to the full text of the indexed articles in order to expand the search
space. As per the literature selection strategy outlined by Levy & Ellis (2006), the
search was limited to peer-reviewed journal articles available within these databases.
Professional magazines and conference proceedings were not included in the search
as the nature of this phase required a homogeneous set of high quality studies.
5.2.2 Snowball Sampling
Once an initial set of quality literature has been collected, additional strategies
should be utilised to gather additional, related research (Levy & Ellis, 2006). Upon
termination of the initial search, systematic strategies for further data collection were
implemented as initially suggested by (Webster & Watson, 2002) for IS research,
and reiterated by Levy & Ellis (2006) along with further suggestions. Two major
strategies were utilised:
• Backward search — this process involves reviewing citations within the collec-
ted literature in order to locate research works that were relevant to each of
these studies. Additionally, prominent author names that emerge are utilised
in further keyword searches by author to locate prior research by authors. For
backward citation search, Google Scholar (Google Inc, 2015) was employed in
order to swiftly locate each study by title. The Web of Science (Thomson
Reuters, 2015) database was utilised to locate further high quality research
outputs from specific authors.
• Forward search — this involves the search for studies that have cited a par-
ticular article under scrutiny, as well as the search for newer literature by
prominent authors. Web of Science (Thomson Reuters, 2015) was utilised to
locate studies that cited each article by searching for the article by title and
using the citation counter link to access other research citing the current study.
5.2.3 Literature Selection
Following a number of iterations of the abovementioned cycle, there emerged a high
incidence of the same studies and arguments reappearing, and a lack of novel cita-
tions emerging from forward searching discovered literature. Accordingly, following
the advice of Levy & Ellis (2006) and Webster & Watson (2002), the literature
search was deemed complete within its narrow scope. The next phase of the liter-
ature review involved the selection of relevant studies from the gathered literature.
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The sample size of the collected literature was initially n=104 peer-reviewed journal
articles that matched the criteria specified above. The articles were subsequently
analysed in terms of their actual topic or research area to ensure that the problem
area was indeed deemed by the researchers to be wicked in nature, and that the
notion of IT-based decision support was addressed in a conceptual or empirical
capacity. A substantial quantity of this literature was discarded due to the primary
aim of these articles being far removed from resolving wicked problems in particular.
The final sample consisted of n=35 peer-reviewed articles from major journals in
the IS and DSS literature, as well as a number of applied fields.
5.3 Coding the Literature
The final 35 articles were classified and coded using a number of qualifiers and
concepts deemed relevant to the study. The initial classification involved the epi-
stemological and methodological paradigms under which each of these studies fell.
The analysis of these paradigms and methods drew on the study performed by
Gonzalez et al. (2006), who incorporated the works of Claver et al. (2000) and Van
Horn (1973) in order to present a coherent framework for classification of theoretical
and empirical studies respectively.
According to the authors, theoretical studies can be further classified as conceptual,
illustrative, and applied-concept studies:
• Conceptual studies — these studies perform a primarily descriptive role, where
theories, models, or other structures are presented along with relevant explan-
ation.
• Illustrative studies — provide recommendations for action and attempt to
provide guidance for the relevant field. These studies focus on what should be
done and how things should be done, rather than providing reasons.
• Applied-concept studies — combine the two abovementioned approaches in
order to provide both conceptual as well as explanatory recommendations.
Empirical studies can similarly be broken down into a number of categories, these
being case studies, field studies, field experiments, and laboratory experiments:
• Case studies — these studies analyse one or a number of cases of a particular
phenomenon within the context of its natural environment, obtaining data
about it through direct interaction.
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Table 5.2: Literature sample articles by research paradigm and method
Paradigm Method Authors
Empirical Case Study
Applegate et al. (1987),
Arias (1996),
Biermann (2011),
Chen & Lee (2003),
Cil et al. (2005),
Dhar (1983),
El-Gayar & Fritz (2010),
Giordano et al. (2007),
Giupponi (2007),
Jankowski et al. (1997),
Klashner & Sabet (2007),
Lourenc¸o & Costa (2007),
Mackenzie et al. (2006),
Marashi & Davis (2007),
Pinson et al. (1997),
Renton & Macintosh (2007)
Field Experiment
Karacapilidis & Papadias (2001),
Jarvenpaa et al. (1988),
Munneke et al. (2007),
Van Kouwen et al. (2009)
Laboratory Experiment
Fan et al. (2010),
Goslar (1986),
Jankowski & Nyerges (2001),
Jarupathirun & Zahedi (2007),
Mclain (2009)
Theoretical Conceptual
Balram & Dragicevic (2006)
Illustrative
Kulinich (2012),
McIntosh et al. (2011),
Van Delden et al. (2011)
Applied-Concept
Conklin & Begeman (1989),
Coorey & Jupp (2014),
Druckenmiller (2009),
Gu & Tang (2005),
Karacapilidis (2000),
Ritchey (2006)
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• Field studies — analyse several cases of phenomena within its natural environ-
ment utilising an experimental design and quantitative data analysis methods.
However, there is little actual experimental control.
• Field experiment studies — utilise both experimental design as well as experi-
mental control, but still operates within the context of the phenomenon under
study.
• Laboratory experiment studies — study the phenomenon in a completely con-
trolled environment divorced from its natural context. This method has the
highest level of control.
The final literature sample is presented in Table 5.2 in terms of each of these cat-
egories. Additionally, the literature was coded in terms of the category of wicked
problem that was explored, the period in which it was published, as well as whether
the underlying perspective of rationality was procedural or substantive in nature.
Classification was achieved by allowing categories to emerge organically as further
studies were analysed as per Gonzalez et al. (2006), without forcing preconceived
codifications onto any of the sources reviewed.
5.4 Quantitative Analysis
In order to address research questions, R.2.3–R.2.6 from Chapter 1, which pertain
to various quantifiable themes in the literature, a number of quantitative analyses
are performed. Each of these are discussed in the relevant sections that follow.
5.4.1 Categories of Wicked Problems in the Literature
The research question R.2.4 synthesised in Chapter 1 aims to discover the types of
wicked problems addressed in the literature sample. To this end, the studies were
coded in terms of a number of categories of wicked problem that were identified in
the literature. These are presented in Figure 5.2 and are as follows:
• Business, organisational, and strategic — these types of decision contexts refer
to problems that typical middle and upper managers face, such as marketing
decisions (Goslar, 1986), organisational planning (Applegate et al., 1987), and
scenario management (Pinson et al., 1997).
• Environmental and natural resource planning — wicked problems in this area
aim to address the management of finite natural resources such as water
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Figure 5.2: Distribution of wicked problem types in the literature
(Giordano et al., 2007; Giupponi, 2007), general environmental policy plan-
ning (Van Kouwen et al., 2009), and global warming challenges (Marashi &
Davis, 2007). Although there is some crossover with spatial planning in terms
of a shared artefact design strategy, the aforementioned problems emphasise
the environmental as opposed to the spatial.
• Public policy and government — in addition to policies regarding environ-
mental issues, a number of studies identify other types of policy making prob-
lems, such as smoking laws (Renton & Macintosh, 2007) and generic policy
issues such as engagement in policy planning (Lourenc¸o & Costa, 2007).
• Spatial planning — problems in this category focus on the problem of plan-
ning in a spatial context, such as urban planning (Arias, 1996), architectural
planning (Coorey & Jupp, 2014), habitat restoration (Jankowski et al., 1997),
and service delivery (Biermann, 2011).
• Multiple stakeholder — although Rittel & Webber (1973) points out that all
wicked problems derive a substantial proportion of their wickedness from the
multiplicity of stakeholders involved, a number of studies such as Cil et al.
(2005) and Karacapilidis & Papadias (2001) explicitly address collaboration
as a wicked problem.
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• Generic — a handful of studies such as Jarupathirun & Zahedi (2007) do not
address a specific wicked problem, but address the concept generically.
• Information technology — wicked problems in this category address issues such
as software design (Jarvenpaa et al., 1988) and IT security (El-Gayar & Fritz,
2010).
• Crisis and emergency situations — these problems include humanitarian and
combat missions in urban areas (Fan et al., 2010) and mission-critical decisions
(Klashner & Sabet, 2007).
According to the literature sample, the most commonly addressed wicked problems
in terms of IT-based decision support are business, organisational and strategic de-
cisions. This might be described as unsurprising due to the fact that initial wicked
problems recognised in the literature in the 1970s were that of organisational plan-
ning (Rittel & Webber, 1973). Other types of planning, such as environmental and
natural resource planning as well as spatial planning, are also common.
5.4.2 Integration of DSS and Wicked Problem Research Over
Time
Research question R.2.5 from Chapter 1 sought to explore the cognisance of wicked
problems in the context of DSSs over the lifespan of the literature. The findings are
summarised in Figure 5.3 in relation to each five-year period.
The literature regarding DSSs for wicked problems only reached prominence in the
early 1980’s following a number of publications exploring conceptual issues around
wicked problems, such as Kunz & Rittel (1970) and Rittel & Webber (1973). Two
conspicuous outliers appear in the bar chart presented. The first outlier relates to the
period of 1991 to 1995, where zero articles matching the rigorous criteria outlined
in Section 5.2.3 were collected. The second outlier, which is far more prominent
than the first, refers to the sudden increase to seventeen articles published in this
area in the period of 2006 to 2010. Aside from these two exceptions, the literature
published per year remains relatively consistent. The trend demonstrates a slow
start, slight dip, and a peak late during the first decade of the 2000s. It should be
noted, however, that the literature sampling process was conducted during the latter
half of 2015. Due to plausible delays in article publication in general, the sample
for the final period may therefore be somewhat incomplete.
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Figure 5.3: Number of articles on DSSs for wicked problems per period
5.4.3 Distribution of Research Designs and Methods
In addition to the two aforementioned research questions synthesised in Chapter 1,
R.2.5 is also addressed by means of analysing the literature sample. The research
designs and methodologies elucidated in the earlier sections are presented along with
the quantity of articles and proportion alongside in Table 5.3.
Almost three-quarters (71.6%) of all of the literature sampled is of empirical design,
with almost half (45.7%) of all of the literature taking on a case study methodology.
This appears to be very much in line with the observation by Gonzalez et al. (2006)
that case studies are increasing in prevalence and popularity in IS research. The
remainder of the empirical literature is almost evenly divided between field exper-
iments and laboratory experiments, corresponding to the findings of Orlikowski &
Baroudi (1991) that demonstrate the emphasis on empirical methods with extensive
control in IS literature in general.
Just over one quarter (28.6%) of all literature sampled was classified as theoretical in
design. Applied-concept studies are the most common in this category, contributing
to a total of almost one fifth (17.1%) of the total literature sample. Illustrative and
conceptual studies are the least prevalent studies of all studies that were actually
represented in the sample at 8.6% and 2.9% respectively.
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Table 5.3: Proportion of literature per research methodology
Methodology Total %
Total empirical 25 71.4
Case studies 16 45.7
Field studies 0 0.0
Field experiments 4 11.4
Laboratory experiments 5 14.3





5.4.4 Substantive and Procedural Support
The final research question that will be answered quantitatively is that of R.2.3,
which inquires as to whether procedural or substantive approaches to decision sup-
port are more prevalent in the literature. Substantial and procedural decision sup-
port are underpinned by the notions of substantive and procedural rationality out-
lined in Chapter 2 respectively. Substantial decision support, according to Mackenzie
et al. (2006), has the following properties:
• Focus on goals.
• Contains a knowledge base of options.
• Contains a knowledge base of known algorithms and calculations.
• Algorithms or calculations may be non-trivial, but aim to derive optimal or at
least “most preferred” solutions.
Likewise, the authors assert that the following properties are characteristic of pro-
cedural decision support :
• Focus on processes.
• Contains tools and processes to support search for alternatives, information
gathering and analysis, and conflict resolution.
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Table 5.4: Conceptions of rationality prevalent in literature




Not Applicable 3 8.6
• Provide a framework to explore a given decision situation.
• Rely on the reason of the decision maker to “find a way through” the decision
situation.
The literature was analysed utilising these definitions with the aim of categorising
each study as primarily viewed through the lens of substantive or procedural decision
support. Heuristically, studies utilising methods to calculate or determine “optimal”
solutions were generally classed as substantive, while studies emphasising the process
of deliberation were typically characterised as procedural in nature. The findings
are summarised in Table 5.4.
From the literature sample, it is clear that procedural decision support is the most
common strategy implemented in DSSs for wicked problems, constituting almost
two thirds of the total number of studies (65.7%). Substantive decision support by
itself is the most rarely employed form of decision support utilised in these DSSs
at just over one tenth of the literature (11.4%). A proportion of the literature
(14.3%) utilises both strategies in DSS conceptualisation, design, or development,
usually combining methods for increasing stakeholder collaboration and alternative
generation, with mathematical methods employed at a later stage in the decision
making process to reach a preferable solution.
5.5 Qualitative Analysis
Qualitative methods were employed for the next phase of the analysis for research
questions, R.2.1–R.2.2 from Chapter 1, which inquire about subjects that are more
complex in nature and require interpretation.
5.5.1 DSS Features for Wicked Problems
To design and develop a quality information system, it is necessary to determine
what is required of such a system either as part of a sequential development method-
ology or in a number of iterations in an evolutionary approach (Avison & Fitzgerald,
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2002). R.2.1 seeks to discover such requirements for the development of DSSs for
wicked problems in general. A number of these requirements were identified in the
literature:
• Participation and collaboration — probably the most widely cited require-
ment for wicked problems resolution in the literature, this requirement em-
phasises the necessity of mechanisms for collaborative understanding of the
wicked problem. This includes but not limited to discussion facilitation, ar-
ticulating preferences, enrichment of collective knowledge, and negotiating the
strategy to be selected via consensus. The emphasis is on subjective perspect-
ives and assumptions (Balram & Dragicevic, 2006; Cil et al., 2005; Conklin
& Begeman, 1989; Giordano et al., 2007; Gu & Tang, 2005; Jankowski et al.,
1997; Jarupathirun & Zahedi, 2007; Jarvenpaa et al., 1988; Karacapilidis, 2000;
Karacapilidis & Papadias, 2001; Klashner & Sabet, 2007; Lourenc¸o & Costa,
2007; Mackenzie et al., 2006; McIntosh et al., 2011; Munneke et al., 2007;
Renton & Macintosh, 2007; Ritchey, 2006; Van Kouwen et al., 2009).
• Conflict management — the subjective essence of wicked problem resolution
necessarily leads to conflict. There is a consensus in the literature that these
conflicting views should not simply be ignored, but should be explored and
reasoned through (El-Gayar & Fritz, 2010; Giordano et al., 2007; Jankowski
et al., 1997; Jarupathirun & Zahedi, 2007; Karacapilidis, 2000; Karacapilidis
& Papadias, 2001).
• Scenario exploration and situation analysis — this involves the analysis of
the problem situation in order to further refine and conceptualise possible
goals and alternatives (Biermann, 2011; Giordano et al., 2007; Goslar, 1986;
Jankowski et al., 1997; Marashi & Davis, 2007; Van Kouwen et al., 2009).
• Reduction of cognitive load — a number of studies demonstrate the need for
reducing information overload in contexts with large amounts of issues that re-
quired attention from decision makers (Druckenmiller, 2009; Fan et al., 2010).
• Transparency and accessibility of evidence — ability to capture evidence for
perspectives or positions and make this available to all stakeholders (Biermann,
2011; Renton & Macintosh, 2007; Ritchey, 2006).
• User interface and visual feedback — the entire decision process should be
presented in a manner that is user-friendly and that provides clear visual
representations of the problem situation and activities involved (Balram &
Dragicevic, 2006; Biermann, 2011; Coorey & Jupp, 2014; Druckenmiller, 2009;
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Giordano et al., 2007; Jankowski et al., 1997; Jankowski & Nyerges, 2001;
Jarupathirun & Zahedi, 2007; Kulinich, 2012; Mackenzie et al., 2006; Marashi
& Davis, 2007; McIntosh et al., 2011; Munneke et al., 2007; Renton & Macin-
tosh, 2007; Ritchey, 2006; Van Delden et al., 2011; Van Kouwen et al., 2009).
• Facilitation of organisational memory — past scenarios should be stored in
an effective manner which facilitates recall and application to current contexts
(Conklin & Begeman, 1989; Chen & Lee, 2003; El-Gayar & Fritz, 2010; Renton
& Macintosh, 2007).
• Flexibility of phases and iterations — the process of wicked problem explor-
ation and capturing of information should not be a once-off, sequential pro-
cess, but may require many iterations to create a cohesive picture as well as
to reach consensus amongst participants. The movements between various
phases should also be flexible as a result (Applegate et al., 1987; Cil et al.,
2005; Kulinich, 2012).
• Reduction of erroneous logic — a characteristic of many DSSs in general, it
is imperative to reveal instances where cognitive biases result in oversights in
the decision process. Consistency checking of information also falls into this
category (Chen & Lee, 2003; Karacapilidis, 2000; Karacapilidis & Papadias,
2001).
• Decision analysis methods — this is a decision analytic aid which relies on
mathematical methods to weight preferences and analyse alternatives (Cil
et al., 2005; Giupponi, 2007; Goslar, 1986; Gu & Tang, 2005; Jankowski et al.,
1997; Jankowski & Nyerges, 2001).
Many of these findings are consistent with the findings made by other authors for
general wicked problem resolution in Chapter 3. Additionally, a great number of
these features match up with the procedural approach to decision support elucidated
in Section 5.4.4. This shows that procedural decision support, which was concep-
tually argued by authors such as Simon (1976) and Mackenzie et al. (2006) to be
the most appropriate for the resolution of wicked problems, is also supported by the
literature as being more suitable than substantive decision support.
5.5.2 A Procedural DSS for Wicked Problems
As a result of the findings regarding the suitability of procedural decision support
over substantive or mixed approaches, a model for the development of a DSS for
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resolving wicked problems is presented in order to address the final secondary re-
search question R.2.1. To produce this model, the 23 articles specifically considering
procedural decision support in the literature were analysed for common themes and
patterns regarding the architecture of such a DSS, as well as the soft factors that
were identified.
5.5.2.1 Architecture
The conceptual architectural model is presented in Figure 5.4. The components are
as follows:
• Repository — a number of studies noted the requirement for the creation
and facilitation of organisational memory. The repository is a generic term
for the storage of previous deliberations, scenarios, and their outcomes. This
allows previous scenarios to be revisited and utilised to inform present concerns
surrounding a particular wicked problem.
• Decision space — this space behaves in a manner analogous to that of a virtual
whiteboard, permitting the capturing of multiple perspectives and facts related
to the problem at hand. This context can be navigated by individuals or
groups in order to make sense of the problem under scrutiny. The movement
between ideas, perspectives, and possible strategies is not strictly enforced
as this process relies on the process of collaboration and negotiation, both of
which can be facilitated by means of a number of useful tools embedded within
the decision space.
• Decision tools — this suite of tools can be used in a standalone fashion or in
tandem in order to explore, analyse, and simulate various issues within the
wicked problem space. Mapping and modelling tools can be used by one or
a number of participants to explore the problem situation linguistically, se-
mantically, or visually. Simulation tools can be utilised to predict the effects
of particular alternatives in the decision space, and analysis tools can be util-
ised to evaluate one or a number of alternatives in terms of the preferences
captured in the decision space.
• User interface — this element of the DSS is imperative to allow stakeholders
to interact with the system in various ways. The UI also allows for various
levels of analysis at which the decision space can be viewed and manipulated.
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Figure 5.4: Synthesised conceptual model of procedural DSSs
5.5.2.2 DSS Design and Development Process
Klashner & Sabet (2007) argue that the traditional SDLC as per Avison & Fitzger-
ald (2002) approach is deterministic in the sense that it presupposes the existence
of tangible and definitive goals of the system under development. Instead, they
argue for a design and development process for DSSs for wicked problems that is
evolutionary in nature, such as the spiral model (Boehm, 1988) and the evolutionary
DSS model (Arnott, 2004) in the general IS literature. The plausible irony that the
design and development of such a DSS for wicked problems may itself constitute
a wicked problem is not always acknowledged in the literature, but it is implicitly
recognised in a number of sources that focus on this process. Thus, it is imperative
to constantly refine the DSS design as new information becomes available.
In addition to the evolutionary nature of the DSS design and development, it is
argued that stakeholder involvement in the design and development process is im-
perative in creating DSSs that adequately address the extreme complexities inherent
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in the relevant wicked problem set.
5.5.2.3 Decision Process
The traditional view of the decision making process developed by Simon (1960)
and elucidated in Chapter 4 involves three discrete phases: intelligence, design, and
choice. Later additions to the model included the phases of implementation of the
decision and review of the decision and its associated consequences. Although the
original intention of the phase model was recursive and iterative movement through
and between the phases (Arnott & Pervan, 2014), it is often treated as a sequential
process very much like the SDLC. Since wicked problems have a non-deterministic
nature, it is not a sensible endeavour to attempt to force these problems to fit a
sequential process of deliberation. Consequently, the actual process of deliberation
undertaken with a procedural DSS is itself cyclical and evolutionary. Stakeholders
can add multiple perspectives, query the decision space, apply analysis and simu-
lation to the space, and evaluate the alternatives in an iterative process, revisiting
activities as necessary.
5.5.2.4 Organisational Structure
El-Gayar & Fritz (2010) as well as a number of other authors argue for organisations
facing wicked problems and implementing DSSs to adopt a Singerian perspective
within the organisation. This perspective, popularised by Courtney (2001), em-
phases the inquiring nature of organisations, and is subsequently suitable in contexts
facing any number of wicked problems. Fundamentally, a Singerian organisation
views reality as holistic in nature, and as a highly interconnected and indivisible
system. Practically, problem solving is therefore undertaken in a holistic manner,
with complex and wicked problems viewed as integrated wholes.
The second important point regarding the Singerian view is closely related to the
heart of the subjective nature of wicked problems. Courtney (2001, p. 29) sum-
marises this defining characteristic with the following quote by Mitroff & Linstone
(1993, p. 99):
All complex problems — especially social ones — involve a multiplicity of
actors, various scientific/technical disciplines, and various organizations
and diverse individuals. In principle, each sees a problem differently and
thus generates a distinct perspective on it.
Therefore, an inquiring, Singerian, organisational context that effectively supports
the procedural DSS will take into account not only the technical elements of a wicked
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problem, but also organisational, personal, ethical, and even aesthetic perspectives.
This corresponds with the requirements for wicked problem resolution, as well as for
procedural decision support presented in the literature.
5.6 Chapter Summary
The aim of this chapter was to elucidate the data collection and analysis method-
ology utilised for the literature, as well as to present the findings from this process
in terms of the research questions synthesised in Chapter 1. Section 5.1 contextual-
ised and introduced the literature study, followed by Section 5.2, which outlined the
literature data collection and review strategy employed in this thesis. Section 5.3 elu-
cidated the method employed in coding the literature for further analysis. Finally,
Section 5.4 presented the quantitative results associated with research questions
R.2.3 – R.2.6 and the nature of wicked problems in the literature, followed by the
final qualitative analysis and results related to procedural DSSs addressing research
questions R.2.1 – R.2.2 in Section 5.5.




The overarching objective of this thesis, as stated in Chapter 1, is to investigate
the advantages of procedural decision support over substantial decision support, to
explore the prevalence of each in the literature, as well as to investigate the nature
of procedural decision support both in the literature and conceptually. To this
end, one primary (R.1 ) and six secondary research questions (R.2.1 – R2.6 ), were
synthesised.
In order to answer these research questions, a three-phase research design was imple-
mented. The first phase comprised the analysis of key themes in the three reference
disciplines of decision making theory, wicked problems, and decision support sys-
tems in Chapters 2, 3, and 4 respectively. These three chapters built the case for the
shortcomings of human rationality, the intense difficulty of wicked decision contexts,
and the notion of supporting these problems utilising DSSs. The second phase of this
research involved the quantitative and qualitative analyses of the literature pertain-
ing specifically to DSSs in the context of wicked problems. The nature of wicked
problems supported by DSSs as well as the characteristics of procedural decision
support were elucidated. The final phase of the study comprised integrating these
perspectives into a cohesive model for procedural decision support. The second and
third phases were both completed in Chapter 5.
Following from this process, this chapter concludes this thesis by summarising the
literature review findings in Section 6.2, delineating a number of limitations inherent
in the research in Section 6.3, as well as providing recommendations for further
research in Section 6.4. Section 6.5. provides the final concluding remarks for this
thesis.
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6.2 Summary of Main Findings
The objective of this section of the chapter is to briefly summarise the primary find-
ings from the literature in terms of the seven research questions posed in Chapter 1 of
this thesis. The findings are presented sequentially in association with each research
question.
6.2.1 Primary Research Question
The primary research question, R.1, was comprised of a number of secondary ques-
tions. Therefore, the findings for each of the corresponding secondary questions
together form the overall findings for this thesis.
6.2.2 Secondary Research Questions
• R.2.1 — the characteristics of DSSs required in the context of wicked prob-
lem resolution in the literature was discovered by qualitatively analysing the
features emphasised in the literature and grouping these together. The fol-
lowing requirements were discovered: participation and collaboration, conflict
management, scenario exploration and situation analysis, reduction of cognit-
ive load, transparency and accessibility of evidence, user interface and visual
feedback, facilitation of organisational memory, flexibility of phases and itera-
tions, reduction of erroneous logic, and decision analysis methods.
• R.2.2 — presenting the essence of a procedural DSS for resolving wicked prob-
lems involved the synthesis of a model for this purpose by qualitatively ana-
lysing the sampled literature. The architecture consists of a repository for
decision storage and retrieval; a virtual decision space for navigation through
and exploration of the problem; decision tools for presenting, structuring, ana-
lysing, and simulating elements of the problem situation; and a user interface
to display snapshots of the decision problem at a given point and at a specific
level of analysis. The design and development process for such a DSS was ar-
gued to be evolutionary and participatory in nature, and the decision process
was also classed as iterative. Finally, the organisational context was presented
as being inquiring in nature, emphasising collaboration and holistic reasoning.
• R.2.3 — the proportion of procedural v.s. substantive decision support in
the literature was investigated by quantitatively analysing the literature to
determine the variant of rationality employed in each study. It was found that
procedural decision support was over five times more prevalent in the literature
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• R.2.4 — similarly, the types of wicked problems addressed by means of DSSs
were discovered by codifying different categories of wicked problem in the
literature, and simply determining the number of studies which fell into each
category. Strategy and business decisions are the most common, followed by
environmental and resource planning problems.
• R.2.5 — the level of cognisance of wicked problems and their associated
modes of IT-based support was determined by counting the number of art-
icles published per five-year period between 1981 and 2015. The period with
the greatest number of publications is 2005 - 2010, with almost half of all of
the articles in the sample.
• R.2.6 — prevalence of research designs and methodologies in the literature
involved determining the number of studies that fell into each codified category.
Empirical case studies are the most common research design and methodology.
6.3 Limitations of the Research
The objective of this section is to address and acknowledge the weaknesses inherent
in this research that were outlined in Chapter 1. These limitations will be discussed
in terms of the research design and literature sampling methods respectively.
6.3.1 Research Design
This thesis made use of a theoretical literature study in order to answer the research
questions synthesised. The perspective employed in analysing the literature data
was interpretive in nature rather than positivist or critical (Orlikowski & Baroudi,
1991). Two possible limitations arise from this fact.
The first limitation of utilising the aforementioned research design is inherent in
the nature of non-empirical approaches for research, where sources are secondary in
nature and therefore don’t represent a first hand account of the phenomena under
observation (Mouton, 2001). Consequently, results are plausibly not as reliable as
they would have been if there had been primary sources of information in addition
to the literature data (Babbie & Mouton, 2007). However, the objective of this
study was to contribute to the theoretical landscape of DSSs for wicked problems
with the goal of furthering development of the field, as argued by Webster & Watson
(2002). The literature review, then, serves as the preliminary first step in the greater
intellectual process of defining the field.
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The second limitation of the research design refers specifically to the interpretive
nature of the qualitative and quantitative methods employed in this thesis. Each
set of analyses relied on interpretation and codification of the literature in terms
of a concept analysis. Codification related to the different research designs and
methodologies employed in the literature was performed in terms of the strategy
outlined by Gonzalez et al. (2006). However, other codes related to the nature of
wicked problems, their requirements, and procedural decision support were allowed
to emerge organically from cumulative study of the literature. Hence, there is a
degree of subjectivity inherent in the categorisation of all emergent themes that must
be admitted. An attempt was made to circumvent a level of bias by utilising the
non-discriminatory approach suggested by Gonzalez et al. (2006), where categories
were not pre-empted prior to analysis of the literature or forced on any of the studies.
6.3.2 Literature Sample and Sampling
A number of issues are evident in the literature sampling strategy. The first issue is
related to the criteria employed in the search for and final selection of the studies
for the sample, specifically, the fact that only those studies explicitly addressing the
notion of wicked or highly unstructured problems in DSS research and practice were
included. Therefore, studies not making reference to decision support and wicked
problems explicitly were excluded, meaning that a significant scope of actual wicked
problems in the literature were not included in the sample. Therefore, the findings
are only realistically applicable to contexts where there is cognisance of the wicked
problem situation as being wicked in nature. For the scope of this thesis, however, it
was considered infeasible to search the literature for all problems which are wicked
regardless of how they are described.
The second limitation of the literature sample relates to its final size. Following the
application of definitive criteria, an initial sample of over 100 studies was reduced
to 35. This is problematic in terms of the reliability of results, although it is argued
that a large proportion of patterns discovered in the literature were significant in
terms of percentages. This is promising for further research which seeks to gather
a larger collection of literature for analysis. Additionally, there is a slight increase
in reliability of findings due to the homogeneity of the studies over a selection of
attributes such as publication type and journal quality.
6.4 Future Work
There exist a number of opportunities for further research in the context of the re-
search area. The first involves addressing the possible deficiency in sampling, where
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further research can be completed utilising a larger sample of literature selected by
characteristics that suggest the wickedness of the problem situation as opposed to
explicit recognition of the problem as wicked.
A second possible avenue for further work involves supplementing and triangulating
the conceptual findings of this study by means of an empirical study. Such research
could involve the investigation of procedural decision support in terms of stakehold-
ers in the problem, as well as the organisational context in which the problem is
embedded.
The final plausible opportunity for further research could address questions regard-
ing the usability or suitability of procedural decision support for wicked problems
in an empirical fashion. Such a study might involve the design development of a
generic procedural DSS artefact and testing of the DSS by means of quantitative or
qualitative surveys.
6.5 Overall Conclusions
In this thesis, a comprehensive literature study was undertaken in order to analyse
and describe the nature of decision support for wicked problems, and to further
elucidate the approach of procedural decision support in such contexts. A number
of findings were presented that demonstrate the prevalence of procedural support in
wicked problem decision support, and describe the essence of a general procedural
DSS for wicked problem resolution. The advantages of such a DSS and its suitability
for addressing wicked problems was also presented in the form of an integrated
model.
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